Hiatus in the Greenhouse: Has the IPCC helped or hindered?

Robin Russell-Jones* and Tom M.L. Wigley**

Dr R Russell-Jones FRCP FRCPath FRSA. Founder Help Rescue the Planet (hrtp.co.uk). Email: robinrusselljones@gmail.com.* Prof T M L Wigley. University of Adelaide and National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR, Boulder, Colorado). Email: TMLWigley@gmail.com

"Best scientists lack the comfort of peers,Their evidence is always at first incredible,Even though later it teaches more.Why do they struggle so?Because in each discovery of new knowledgeLies an awareness of the beauty and worth of human life That enslaves them as guardians of human destiny."

Clair Patterson, April 1981.(Patterson correctly dated the age of the Earth: Science 1955).

WORD COUNT: 9653 (includes Abstract, Main Text, Figure (n=1), Captions, Table (n=2) and References.

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Abstract.

Created in 1988, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has produced reports every 5-8 years on which the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) rely to advise governments on the measures needed to achieve the goals originally set out at the Earth Summit of 1992, and, subsequently, in the Paris Agreement (PA) of 2015. Over the years there has been an increasing disconnect between the measures needed and the action taken. We examine whether the IPCC or the UNFCCC could have done more to address this disconnect and discuss the advantages of a Global Carbon Incentive Fund and related funds as an equitable method of imposing a global carbon tax and GHG taxes, as well as a Global Carbon Historical Reparation Fund (GCHRF). Temperature data are described that demonstrate that the Paris warming limit of 1.5C may well be breached before 2030. We identify problems in the UNFCCC definition of net-zero and point out that it fails to include all species that influence global temperatures and so is not relevant to the goals of Article 2 of the PA. We use climate model calculations to estimate the dates by which GHG net-zero, and all-species net-zero needs to be reached in order to achieve temperature stabilization at 1.5C and 2.0C. We argue that short reports by the IPCC will be more valuable going forward than all-encompassing scientific reports.

Authors’ comment: This is the second of a pair of complementary papers submitted to Oxford Open Climate Change that critique the Paris Agreement [1]. This second review

also critiques the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).. There is some overlap between the two papers, judged necessary to ensure that the papers are self-contained and may be read without reference to the other paper. We refer to paper #1 as the companion paper.

1. Political Considerations

1.1 History of the IPCC

The Villach Conference of 1985 was a seminal event in the history of climate change and led to the formation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988. Two people present at the Conference were particularly influential: Mostafa Tomba, Executive Director of the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP) who oversaw the creation and ratification of the Montreal Protocol, and Jim Bruce who was second in command at the World Meteorological Organization. They wanted the UN General Assembly to establish an apolitical scientific advisory body to report on global warming, but the Reagan administration was concerned about losing control of the climate change agenda, and lobbied for the creation of an intergovernmental body, with input from government-nominated delegates [2].

Climate scientists were already becoming alarmed about the consequences of global warming. James Hansen of NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies (GISS) warned the US Congress in June 1988 that global warming was already a reality. In November 1988, a London-based international conference on stratospheric ozone depletion, organised by Russell-Jones (RRJ), included a session on global warming, chaired by the late Sir John Maddox, editor of Nature. The Director of the Climatic Research Unit at the University of East Anglia, Tom Wigley stated publicly: “Future global warming is virtually certain and likely to be substantial” [3].

At that time the global-mean atmospheric CO2 concentration was 350 ppm (it is now 423 ppm,) and observed global warming from the late nineteenth century was only 0.5C (it is now more than twice that figure). Wigley, in ref. 3, predicted 1.5C of warming by 2030, which is remarkably prescient. The Lancet was the first medical journal to tackle

the problem of global warming. An unsigned editorial (4), (written by Russell-Jones and titled Health in the Greenhouse), appeared in April 1989. It stated: “Action to combat global warming must not be allowed to await the results of further research. Remedial measures are needed now”. 35 years later this editorial, and the 1988 conference, was the subject of a Lancet essay by D S Jones, Professor of Science History at Harvard, and titled “Still Seeking Health in the Greenhouse [5].

The first IPCC science assessment report (AR1) was produced in 1990, with further reports in 1995, 2001, 2007, 2013 and 2021. It is noticeable how the time for each cycle has gradually lengthened to 8 years. This is perhaps inevitable as the scope and complexity of scientific studies on climate change has increased. For example, the latest scientific assessment report (AR6) from Working Group 1, reviewed 14,000 papers and ran to 3949 pages. It was released on Aug. 9, 2021, almost two years before the corresponding Synthesis Report of 2023, which, by then, was based on scientific knowledge that was 2-3 years out of date. The Synthesis Report itself has to be signed off by all of the 195 signatory nations to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and many heated debates have taken place over the years with oil- rich states such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia trying to weaken the recommendations to policy makers. It is unsurprising therefore that the IPCC has proceeded cautiously. In AR2 (1995), it stated that it was more than 50% likely that man-made emissions were contributing to climate change. In AR3, this had become 66%, 90% in the fourth report (2007) and 95% in AR5 (2013). This incremental approach may be good science, but, crucially, it has failed to convey the imperative for urgent action.

While the IPCC was becoming slowly more confident, some would say at a glacial pace, public opinion travelled in the opposite direction. A 2013 survey by the UK Energy Research Centre found that those who did not ‘believe’ in man-made climate change had more than quadrupled since 2005 from 4% to 19% [6]. A US study in 2017 found that 40% of Americans took the view that climate change is a hoax [7]. Clearly, this cannot be laid at the door of the IPCC; but there has been a reluctance on the part of IPCC scientists to confront climate sceptics publicly, which allows the climate denial lobby to broadcast disinformation without fear of censure or challenge.

The extent to which the fossil-fuel industry has misled the public, gullible journalists, and law-makers is only now becoming apparent [8, 9]. Whether a more proactive stance would have made any difference is hard to judge. The main political obstacle to progress at the annual UNFCCC Conference of Parties (COP) events is the requirement for unanimity, which has allowed reluctant nations to frustrate progress on climate mitigating policies [10]. This is probably the main reason that the UN has never achieved a global tax on carbon, despite widespread agreement that an incremental carbon tax would be the quickest route to decarbonization.

1.2. Taxing Carbon

In March 1993, the UK introduced a fuel price escalator which increased the cost of fossil fuels above the inflation rate; In 2000, following protests about the rising cost of fuel, Gordon Brown announced that fuel prices would only increase at the same rate as inflation (11) In 2011, the Coalition Government replaced the fuel price escalator with the fuel duty stabilizer. Since then, the Tory-dominated British government has refused to increase the fuel tax any further, even though it has been taken to the High Court by ClientEarth three times over illegal levels of nitrogen dioxide. The Conservative Government was equally unmoved when the death of Ella Roberta Kissi-Debrah in South London was attributed by the coroner to air pollution (12).

Finland was the first country to introduce a carbon tax based on CO2 emissions, closely followed by Sweden in 1991. Sweden now has the highest carbon tax of any country in the world (13), set at SEK1190 (equivalent to US$126 per tonne of CO2.

One way to reduce fossil fuel dependence is by incentivizing the development of renewable energy. To this end, the UN has proposed the transfer of US$100 billion from developed to developing nations, called the Climate Finance Fund (14). However, while the scheme was adopted over a decade ago at COP16, it has only very recently managed to raise the necessary funds. For its part, the UK government reduced its Overseas Development Grant from 0.7 to 0.5 percent of its GDP in 2021. Overall, the Global North dislikes the seemingly “charitable” nature of the scheme, whilst the Global South dislikes the conditional nature of the funds.

A more productive approach for the UNFCCC might be to concentrate its efforts on the six ,(or possibly the ten) biggest emitters, (China (24%), US (14%), EU (10%), India (7.5%), Russia (5%) and Japan (2%) in that order) which, together, account for more than three fifths of global CO2 emissions; and persuade these countries to form an action-oriented “coalition of the willing” (15). One way to achieve this is to persuade them to adopt the Global Carbon Incentive Fund GCIF) as the best available financial instrument for achieving the long-term goal of stabilizing, and eventually reducing GHG concentrations in the atmosphere, as delineated at the Rio Summit of 1992. We say reducing, as CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere have increased from 355 to 423 ppm in the intervening period.

In 2019, Professor Raghuram Rajan, former chief economist at the IMF, described a financial instrument that would transfer funds to the Global South by imposing a carbon

levy on high emitting nations, and called it the “Global Carbon Reduction Inventive.” (16) This has been developed and renamed the “Global Carbon Incentive Fund” (GCIF) by RRJ, the first author on this article (17-19).

Countries would be required to contribute to the Fund if their annual carbon emissions per capita surpassed the global average and receive payments from the fund if their carbon emissions per capita were below the global average. Border carbon adjustment taxes would be imposed on countries that failed to cooperate or refused to contribute appropriately to the Fund.

There are different ways of calculating a country’s emissions. The National Emissions Inventory (NEI) covers all GHGs, but only considers “territorial” emissions produced inside the frontiers of the country. The NEI figures thus exclude the carbon footprint of imported goods, international aviation, and shipping. The Global Carbon Project (GCP) publishes country- specific carbon dioxide data annually for “industrial” fossil fuel emissions, which includes energy and cement production; in 2018, the GCP produced a global figure of 36.6 gigatonnes of CO2, i.e. 4.8 tonnes per capita. The advantage of the GCP data is that it provides both production- and consumption- based emissions by country, starting in 1990. Of these, the consumption-based emissions data reflects more

accurately the carbon footprint of a country (2021 is the latest year for which both production- and consumption-based GCP data are available).

High emitters such as China and Russia will benefit from a consumption-based system, as they export more than they import; while Japan, the EU, the US and the UK will pay more using such data. Conversely, the latter are countries that have benefited most from historical emissions.

The simplest way for high-emitting countries to raise the necessary funds would be to tax fossil fuel products, the fossil fuel industry, or preferably both. Furthermore, the new Labour administration in the UK should impose VAT on airline fuel and give consideration to imposing punitive prices on frequent flyers. Another progressive change would be to introduce charges for gas and electricity that avoids standing charges; but imposes increasing unit costs with higher usage.

1.3 The Global carbon Incentive Fund (GCIF)

The GCIF idea was developed by RRJ, who suggested that the calculations would be more equitable if they were based, not on production, (ie territorial emissions from a particular country), but on consumption-based data (ie Territorial emissions, minus exports plus imports) (17-19; 15): data which is readily available as it is collected on an annual basis by virtually every country in the world as part of the UN reporting process , and published by World in Data. The primary basis for the GCIF is consumption-based emissions of CO2 (CBECO2). However these data are based on returns made by individual countries, so there is considerable scope for under-reporting, particularly if high emitters are going to be penalized financially. This problem could be solved if the UN establishes an independent watch-dog agency to monitor the reporting of carbon emissions globally, analogous to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IEAE), and titled the UN International Carbon Monitoring Agency (ICMA).

Given accurate reporting of country-specific CBECO2 data, the CGIF proposal can be implemented. First, countries that emit more industrial CO2 per capita than the global average would pay a levy into a UN-administered fund, the amount of which would depend on the difference between that country’s CO2 emissions per capita and the global average; multiplied by the population of that country; times a carbon tariff (which could, for example, start at $30 per tonne of CO2 and then rise incrementally). Countries that emit less industrial CO2 per capita than the global average would receive funding

that depends again on the difference between that country’s CO2 emissions per capita and the global average.

Table 1

Levies and Sums Received by Different Countries at US$30 and US$60 Per Tonne of Carbon Dioxide using 2021 as the base-line period.

Country Population	Per capita annual emissions CO2	Price Per Tonne of CO2 US$30	Price per tonne of CO2 US$60
India1.353 billion	1.7 tonnes pa (Consumption-based)	US$126 billion GAIN	US$252 billion GAIN
China1.428 billion	6.3 tones pa (Consumption-based)	US$64 billion LEVY	US$128 billion LEVY
United States 327 million	18 tonnes pa (Consumption-based)	US$129 billion LEVY	US$258 billion LEVY
EU-27448 million	6.7 tonnes pa (Consumption-based)	US$26 billion LEVY	US$51 billion LEVY
United Kingdom 66 million	5.5 tonnes pa (Production-based)	$1.4 billion	$2.8 billion
2018 Data	8.0 tonnes pa (Consumption-based)	$6.4 billion LEVY	$12.8 billion LEVY $10 billion Worse Off

Table 1

The country that will benefit the most is India. In 2018, its population was 1.353 billion and per capita emissions were 1.7 tonnes per annum, using consumption-based data. Since India is below the global average of 4.8 tonnes, it will receive US$126 billion per annum, with a tariff of US$30 per tonne of CO2. This will, in turn, incentivize India to develop its huge potential for solar power. Meanwhile, the country that stands to lose the most from using consumption-based emissions data is the UK. While production-based emissions have fallen from 600 megatonnes in 1990 to 366 in 2018 (UK average, 5.5 tonnes per capita), consumption-based emissions have increased from 657.8 MT in 1990 to 728.8 MT in 2007, before falling back to 530 MT in 2018 (UK average, 8.0 tonnes per capita). Thus, using a consumption-based system, the UK will have to pay US$6.5 billion ([8 – 4.8] x 66 million x US$30) as opposed to US$1.4 billion—an increase of US$5 billion. Thus, the British government has and is likely to resist a consumption-based system (After Russell- Jones 2021- Ref 19)

The beauty of this scheme is that it incentivizes high emitters to reduce their emissions, whilst providing an incentive for low emitters to go down the clean energy route, rather than building more coal-fired power stations. It is also the ideal financial instrument for implementing “Contraction and Convergence” which was itself recognized as the most equitable method for apportioning carbon budgets between countries at COP 3 in 1997 (20,21). Since then, however, there has been little or no deliberation on this instrument, with the exception of a letter in the Financial Times in 2021 (22). The letter was signed by Colin Challen, Former Chair, All-Party Parliamentary Group on Climate Change; Robin Stott, Executive member, UK Climate & Health Alliance; Bill McGuire, Professor Emeritus of Geophysical & Climate Hazards at UCLH; and Aubrey Meyer, Director, Global Commons Institute.

1.4. Pricing the GCIF Proposal

We suggest that the fund should start at a minimum carbon price of US$30 per tonne of CO2, which is considerably below the current carbon price on the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). If this strategy is adopted at COP30 in 2026, then the tariff could increase every other year depending on the effectiveness of the scheme. For example, if the scheme is rolled out in 2026 and the price doubled every other year, by 2032, the tariff per tonne of CO2 would be US$240. Alternatively, it could start at US$60 per tonne of CO2, and double in price every three years. Given the urgency of the situation, this might be the better option.

Certainly, fossil fuel-dependent industries may be inclined to object to such a scheme, particularly if they are being taxed to pay for it. However, it must be emphasized that similar carbon pricing mechanisms have already been implemented in several countries. Sweden currently operates at a carbon price of US$126 per tonne of CO2 (13). Second BP is already factoring in a carbon price of US$100 per tonne of CO2 by 2030 (Neale Smither Personal Communication). Moreover, according to the IMF, fossil fuel emissions were costing the global community roughly US$145 per tonne of CO2 in 2015, mainly in the form of societal costs from air pollution (23).

Regarding the six biggest emitters, India is likely to be most cooperative, since it will receive a considerable amount of funds from other countries. Further, the EU is already committed to a redistribution model, and the US under Joe Biden is also taking climate change seriously. One can expect further support if Kamala Harris wins the presidency in November. China, the world’s biggest emitter, and Russia need to recognize that the levy under the GCIF model will be significantly lower using a consumption-based system, and in addition Russia will gain considerably from its vast untouched forest resources under the GEIF-T scheme (see below). The GCIF proposal could be presented by the UN following a series of Sunrise Scenario pilots as laid out in May 2022 at a virtual Ramphal Institute Commonwealth Conference by Titus Alexander and others (24,25). For the purposes of such a pilot scheme: aimed at assessing feasibility, and not transferring large sums of money; the tariff could be set low at US$1 per tonne of CO2. Once these pilot schemes have been successfully executed, the GCIF model could be adopted by the UN, with inputs from countries that have gained experience from Sunrise Scenario pilots.

Sadly, nothing much came of the Ramphal conference, possibly because the UK government was reluctant to support a consumption-based scheme, so the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in 2022 was similarly disinterested. However,

this was a mistake for the UK and CHOGM. As the host of COP26, the UK must look beyond short-term losses and demonstrate to the world that it can still play a global role post-Brexit. Historically, UK emissions have been amongst the highest and, before 1800, represented virtually 100 percent of anthropogenic carbon emissions. As the country that initiated the Industrial Revolution and has benefited greatly from the burning of fossil fuels, the UK must now lead by example in the international community and promote a roadmap that will help solve global warming in the long term. Already, the UK serves as a great example of the potential of renewable energy: over the past 30 years, it has decarbonized its electricity supply while increasing the size of its economy by 80 percent, proving that renewables do not constitute a hindrance to development. It should follow through by promoting the GCIF and other proposals at the upcoming CHOGM meeting in Samoa in October 2024. Resolutions agreed there can then be presented to the UNFCCC at the COP 30 meeting in Brazil in 2025.

Fortunately, Professor Rathuram Rajan did contribute to the Ramphal conference, and later to the IMF, and suggested that the GCIF proposal should be extended to include non- CO2 GHGs (26,27).

1.5. Non-CO2 Incentive Funds

GCIF deals primarily industrial emissions of CO2 but excludes transport and other non- industrial CO2 sources. Therefore, separate funds would be needed for emissions of other important GHGs such as non-industrial CO2, and methane. An obvious title for the latter is the Global Methane Incentive Fund (GMIF). All other GHG emissions could be captured by GOATIF, the Global Ozone Agriculture and Transport Incentive Fund which would include both domestic and international forms of transport, something that the UNFCCChasfailedtoaddressadequately.Itwouldincludeall non-industrialCO2 emissions including AFOLU and all anthropogenic non-CO2 GHG emissions apart from those listed under GMIF; plus halocarbons and secondary GHGs such as tropospheric ozone. GMIF, the Global Methane Incentive Fund includes all industrial methane emissions but excludes AFOLU.A fourth Incentive Fund is also required to capture other emissions that affect global temperatures: notably black carbon (warming effect) and aerosols (cooling effect). This can be called GABCIF (Global Aerosols & Black Carbon Incentive Fund)

It would also seem appropriate to create a UN administered fund to deal with historic emissions over the past 200 years. In this hierarchy, it is the US, not China that leads the way, followed by the EU. This would require a one-off payment from high to low- emitting nations, akin to a war reparation. Historical territorial CO2 emissions would form the basis of the calculation. More difficult would be to agree the price levied on a tonne of CO2. However, there is an analogy with slavery. When slavery was abolished in the UK around 1830, the slave owners were given £20 million by the UK Parliament in compensation, a debt that is still being paid off today, and is roughly equivalent to £20 billion in today’s money. One suggestion is for the historical high emitters to pay a levy to the low emitters equivalent to £20 billion per annum over the course of a decade, but

this proposal needs serious discussion by those countries most affected. The fund could be titled the Global Carbon Historical Reparation Fund (GCHRF).

Finally, it would help if the IPCC changed its modus operandi from comprehensive all- encompassing scientific reports to shorter more frequent “Special Reports”, updating the science on specific subjects where important progress has been made. It should be noted, however, that four countries, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Russia and disgracefully the US under President Trump refused to endorse a Special Report by the IPCC in 2018 on the consequences of passing 1.5C, the warming threshold stipulated in the Paris Agreement (28). With the change in the presidency after 2020, the US is no longer part of the opposition cartel. The remaining three nations, who have significant vested interests in promoting the sale and distribution of fossil fuels, and who have done much to hamper progress at the annual COP events since their inception, must either be compelled to cooperate through the mechanism of carbon border adjustment taxes, and/or declared international pariahs bent on the destruction of planet Earth. It should further be noted that Russia, China, and Saudi Arabia, together with India, Turkey and disgracefully Australia, refused to agree to a ban on coal-burning at the G20 meeting in July 2021.

Keeping these developments in mind, the UN must attempt to move away from resolutions requiring unanimity. In the upcoming COPs 29 & 30, resolutions are currently still required to be unanimous, which means that any one country can frustrate the will of the majority. This is a system that is designed to fail and explains why the last 28 COP meetings have had no discernible impact on the upward trajectory in global GHG emissions. For the COPs to be a success, it is imperative to find a way around the unanimity roadblock. The quickest way to resolve this dilemma is to concentrate on the 6 or 10 biggest emitters, persuade them to collaborate in a Coalition of the Willing, and then other nations will simply have to fall into line.

In conclusion, the GCIF will penalize developed nations for profligate energy use and incentivize developing nations to avoid fossil fuels. Moreover, it provides a financial instrument to enforce “Contract and Converge,” which was cited as the most equitable framework for mitigating climate change at COP3 in 1997.

2. Scientific Considerations

2.1 Net-zero

The original purpose of the UNFCCC was clearly enunciated at the Rio Summit of 1992. Article 2 states: “The ultimate objective of this Convention ...is to achieve...stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous interference with the climate system”.

In 2015, the focus changed from atmospheric GHG concentrations to temperature constraints. Thus, Article 2 of the Paris Agreement called on signatory nations to hold

“the increase in global-mean temperature (GMT) to well below 2C”, while pursuing efforts to “limit the temperature increase to 1.5C above pre-industrial levels”. Article 4.1 states: “In order to achieve the long-term temperature goals set out in Article 2, ... Parties should aim to reach global peaking of GHG emissions as soon as possible ... and to undertake rapid reductions thereafter ... so as to achieve a balance between anthropogenic emissions and removals by sinks in the second half of this century”.

This heralded the concept of net-zero, a proposal that had first been made in 1990 in a paper that seems to have gone un-noticed by the IPCC [29]; although, in neither Article 4.1, nor ref. 25, is the term “net-zero” used. The date by which net-zero should be achieved for GHG emissions was later strengthened to 2050, and adopted by 74 nations at COP 26 in 2021. It was enshrined as a primary goal of climate policy at COP 28 in Dubai. Some countries, including the UK have written the target into domestic law. The idea, however, is flawed, as set out below, and detailed in the companion paper to this manuscript [1].

There are a number of problems with the net-zero concept. First, it is ambiguous unless the operating variable is stated ... for example, it can be applied to CO2 alone; to all GHGs, (or more specifically to the aggregate of all GHGs: “GHG net-zero”); or it can be extended to include all other species such as aerosols which also affect global temperature but are not GHGs, “all-species net-zero”. This can be a source of confusion.

Second, there is no formally agreed definition for net-zero, and the term is used in various ways in different publications. A recent definition appears in a UN report from Nov. 2022, which states (recommendation 1): “Net-zero refers to a state by which GHGs going into the atmosphere are reduced as close to zero as possible and any residual emissions are balanced by permanent removals from the atmosphere" [30]. In practical terms, this is problematic. How does one define “as close to zero as possible”; or, what is meant by “permanent removals”? Trees are part of the carbon cycle so planting trees can only be a temporary solution, albeit relevant on multi-decadal timescales. Carbon capture and storage (CCS) could be offered as a permanent removal mechanism, but, currently, there is no viable technology that could remove CO2 from power plant emissions at anything like the scale needed. Meanwhile, the fossil fuel industry uses CCS as a “get out of jail free card” (31). Geoengineering solutions like direct “Carbon Dioxide Removal” from the atmosphere (CDR) may well provide a permanent removal mechanism, but is only available at small scale. Secondly, in order to remove more CO2 than it produces, the process would need to operate with a “green” energy supply which is not yet available in most countries [31]. 80% of world energy is still supplied by fossil-fuel combustion, (according to BPs Energy Outlook).

Scientifically, “net CO2 emissions” is the sum of all CO2 sources minus the sum of all CO2 sinks. For the aggregate of GHGs, the only valid scientific definition for “net-zero”, therefore, is a situation whereby there is a balance between the sum of all GHG sources (both natural and anthropogenic) and the sum of all GHG sinks [32]. The sixth IPCC

report (AR6), however, defines net-zero for CO2 as occurring “... when anthropogenic CO2 emissions are balanced by anthropogenic removals”. This wording implies, but doesn’t specifically state, that natural sources and sinks stay constant, which is scientifically untenable with a warming planet.

The result of this confusion is highlighted by the debate about carbon offsets and forestry. IPCC recognizes two man-made actions that will increase carbon sinks in managed forests: planting trees and reduced logging. But signatory nations are keen to offset all of the carbon stored in forests, managed or otherwise, even though the majority of trees are untouched [33]. Similar considerations apply to other GHGs. Ploughing up peat bogs will release CO2 and methane, so, theoretically, a carbon offset could be claimed by any company that buys the land and leaves the peat bog untouched. In this situation however, nothing has changed and nothing would have been offset. It is simply accountancy sleight-of-hand, a problem that underlies many of the voluntary carbon credit schemes (VERs) vaunted by the Green Finance Institute and others (34).

Thus, carbon offsets become a diversion from the real task of reducing emissions at source. James Hansen has described carbon credits as being the equivalent of “Medieval Indulgences,” (35) allowing people to assuage their guilt while continuing to contribute to climate deterioration.

At a national level, when governments set a target date for net zero, carbon credits are seen as an alternative to zero carbon emissions since certain sectors are difficult to decarbonize. However, Certified Emission Reductions (CER) schemes are not applied globally, giving companies the option to move production to countries where no ETS operates. To prevent this, the EU has threatened to impose a Carbon Border Adjustment Tax, but this may be difficult to implement if it conflicts with World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements. Additionally, such a tax is unlikely to be accepted by countries that either export fossil fuels or rely heavily on them.

In the context of all GHG sources and sinks (both natural and anthropogenic), these confusions might be resolved through a Global Carbon Incentive Scheme that rewards countries who leave forests and other carbon sinks intact. This could be titled the “Global Ecosystem Incentive Fund (GEIF)”, and could be applied to either terrestrial (GEIF-T) or marine ecosystems (GEIF-M). There is, however, a further and more fundamental problem about relying on terrestrial or marine ecosystems to offset carbon emissions: they are not static entities. On a warming planet droughts and fires resulting from climate change, can cause forests to change from carbon sinks to carbon emitters, potentially causing havoc with net-zero plans [36]. Similar considerations apply to the marine environment.

TABLE 2. Global Incentive Funds

A. Current Emissions

GCIF = Global Carbon Incentive Fund (industrial emissions including cement)GMIF = Global Methane Incentive Fund (All industrial methane emissions excluding AFOLU )GOATIF = Global Ozone, Agriculture, & Transport Incentive Fund: ie Everything else. Includes all non-industrial CO2 emissions including AFOLU and all anthropogenic non- CO2 GHG emissions apart from those listed under GMIF; plus halocarbons and secondary GHGs such as tropospheric ozone.GABCIF = Global Aerosols & Black carbon Incentive Fund

B. Sinks and systems

GEIF-T = Global Ecosystem Incentive Fund: Terrestrial Sinks GEIF-M = Global Ecosystem Incentive Fund: Marine Biosphere

C Historical emissions

GCHRF = Global Carbon Historical Reparation Fund

2.2 Breaching 1.5C

In the following Sections (2.2-2.5) we discuss four important issues that are rarely if ever considered by policy makers. The first concerns the definition of breaching the 1.5C limit stipulated in the Paris Agreement (PA).

One potential problem with the PA concerns the wording of Article 2 of the Agreement. While somewhat ambiguous, this implies that, to be in accord with the Agreement, global-mean temperature (GMT) must remain less than 1.5C. This raises the issue of the increasingly likely possibility of breaching the 1.5C threshold in the near future, when that might occur, how we can be sure that it has occurred, and what the legal implications of passing 1.5C might be.

When talking about GMT possibly breaching 1.5C, we are, of course talking about the anthropogenic component of observed GMT. The date by which 1.5C is officially breached refers to the occasion when the anthropogenic signal passes 1.5C. We refer to this here as the “Detection Year”.

Defining the Detection Year is not a trivial task as we need to account for both noise in the observations and uncertainties in the signal. In published estimates of the Detection Year, it is not always clear how authors have accounted for these uncertainties.

In 2018, Xu and co-workers [37) predicted that 1.5C would be breached by 2030. In 2023, Hansen and co-workers [38] presented data showing a linear rise in GMT since 1970 of 0.18C per decade. Although unstated, the authors assume that the future

“signal” would continue the past trend. However, they also noted that, since 2010, the warming rate has increased to 0.27C per decade [34], an alternative estimate for the signal, which, if valid, would bring the Detection Year closer to the present (2029 to be specific) than if the longer trend period were used for the signal.

In our companion paper (1), we provide a similar analysis using a different global temperature data set (HadCRUT5.0-analysis). The figures from these data are actually slightly worse than Hansen’s. Our long-term (1974 to 2023) trend is 0.20C per decade, and the shorter-term (2010 to 2023) trend is 0.28C per decade.

Extrapolation of these trends leads to the same 1.5C crossing points as Hansen. Even so, our interpretation of these results does not fully agree with Hansen, as we cannot account for uncertainties in either the anthropogenic signal, nor the background noise of natural variability. Readers may conclude however that this is more of an academic quibble than a disagreement.

Rosen et al. [39] present a different type of analysis. These authors consider cases where the observed warming passes 1.5C in the single year 2024 (Case 1), in all three years 2024, 2025 and 2026 (Case 2), and in all five years 2024,5,6,7 and 8 (Case 3). They give probabilistic results for these cases that account for future signal uncertainties, but do not consider the noise in the observations. Specifically, the likely (66% probability) Detection Year estimates for their three cases are: Case 1, 2035; Case 2, 2031; Case 3, 2030.

From these results: Xu et al 2018 (37), Hansen et al 2023 (38), and the results presented in our companion paper [1]; it is apparent that there is now no possibility of staying within the 1.5C limit, and the best we can hope for is to overshoot the 1.5C target, and then claw back towards the long-term target of 1.5C by means of rapid emissions reductions and/or the use of carbon negative technologies (which do not yet exist at anything like the scale necessary).

The issue of determining when the 1.5C anthropogenic warming threshold will be, or has been passed is important. There is a danger that rogue companies or countries could take advantage of the uncertainties and continue to deny that the threshold has been passed, even in the face of mounting evidence that it has indeed been breached.

2.3 Global Warming Potentials

Global Warming Potentials (GWPs) are used to calculate the forcing effect of non-CO2 GHGs in relation to CO2, to determine so-called CO2-equivalent emissions. GWPs are essentially a scaling factor, but their values depend on the time horizon over which the emissions comparison is made. The time-horizon dependence means that the use of GWPs is scientifically unsound. Methane, for example, is a relatively short-lived, but much more potent gas compared with CO2. At a time horizon of 20 years, fossil-fuel

derived methane has a GWP 83 times that of an equivalent mass of CO2. At 100 years, however, because a large fraction of a pulse emission of methane will have decayed, the figure is smaller, 35 according to AR6.

The IPCC and UNFCCC have arbitrarily decided to use 100-year GWPs for all non-CO2 GHGs, which produces serious discrepancies. For example, if we run a climate model to determine the cooling effect of a methane emissions reduction, and then compare this with a parallel calculation using GWP-100, then the latter underestimates the true temperature perturbation by 56%: (see our companion paper (1). This matters when aggregating the effect of CO2 with other GHG emissions as GWP-based calculations underlie the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). Countries that rely more on methane reductions will be short-changed compared with countries that rely more on CO2 reductions.

2.4 Aerosols

The IPCC and UNFCCC consider only GHGs in their net-zero assessments, but GHGs are not the only species to influence global temperatures. Aerosols can reflect sunlight back into space and therefore exert a cooling effect, particularly sulphate aerosols from burning coal or bunker fuel used in shipping. Aerosols also impact cloud formation and therefore have an indirect effect on global warming which is likely larger than their direct effect [38]. In most emissions scenarios, the cooling effect of aerosols emitted from coal combustion is comparable to, and of opposite sign to the warming effect of the concomitant CO2 emissions. So, in terms of temperature effects, aerosols cannot be ignored.

In 2010 the UN International Maritime Organization (IMO) mandated a reduction in the sulphur content of maritime fuels to 1% for ships close to the coasts of North America and Northern Europe, further reduced to 0.1% in 2015. A global limit of 0.5% became operative in 2020 [40] which led to a 50% reduction in global ship-tracks [41]. In addition, China began to fit desulphurization equipment on its power stations, particularly those located in urban areas, not simply to mitigate the effects of acid rain, but to reduce local air pollution [42]. Resolutions at COP 26 proposed a global phase-out of coal as a fuel for power stations, something that is already happening in the EU following the Large Combustion Plant Directive. COP 26 only managed to agree on a phase-down.

Burning coal produces both CO2 and SO2 emissions, so reduced coal combustion causes both cooling (less CO2) and warming as reducing SO2 emissions lowers the atmospheric aerosol loading [43]. While there are uncertainties in the magnitude of such an effect, it cannot be ignored (43). It may well explain part of the current acceleration in the rate of warming [38], although this remains controversial. Clearly, any definition of net-zero that is relevant to the warming targets of Article 2 of the PA must include all species that affect global temperatures, and not just GHGs.

2.5 The Marine Surface Micro- Layer (SML).

There is one further problem that has recently received considerable attention, but which the most recent IPCC report was unable to address: namely the potential significance of the marine Surface Micro-Layer (SML) in the context of climate change. The SML contains phytoplankton, which photosynthesize CO2 to oxygen, and zooplankton which eat phytoplankton, but also provide recycling nutrients. The SML is therefore an important component of the ocean carbon cycle. However, the SML contains pollutants at concentrations much greater than the underlying water column, including “forever” lipophilic chemicals, hydrophobic black carbon particles often laden with polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, and microplastics which may themselves become saturated with lipophilic chemicals [44]. Such microplastics are toxic to zooplankton, leading to an increased phytoplankton population, and increased production of Omega 3 fatty acid lipids which can be detected as areas of flat water from space [45,46]. However, because the zooplankton provide essential nutrients, and because of the pollutants within the SML, there has been a steady decline in phytoplankton numbers of 50% globally since 1958, a decline that is continuing at 1% per annum [47]. In passing it should be noted that a similar trajectory has also been observed with human sperm counts, which has also been linked to the widespread use of plastic and forever chemicals, notably phthalates (48).

At the same time, ocean acidification from dissolved CO2 causes a shift away from carbonate-sensitive plankton and silica-based diatoms. It has been claimed that ocean pH will reach 7.95 as early as 2045, but this projection is based on a “Business as usual” high emissions scenario (RCP 8.5). It has further been claimed that a pH as low as 7.95 (the current level is around 8.05, with lower levels in locations such as the Barents Sea), could lead to marine ecosystem collapse [49].

Whether the ocean pH could drop a further 0.1 units to 7.95 depends on the level of CO2 (PCO2) reached in the atmosphere. The change (D) in ocean pH is related to the atmospheric PCO2 level by DpH = --DpPCO2)/1.1, where “p” denotes –log10(..). As the current PCO2 level is about 423 ppm, this means that a drop of 0.1 pH units to 7.95 would not occur until PCO2 reached 541ppm. RCP 8.5 does indeed reach this level in 2045, but, by this time, global warming in this scenario is already well above the Article 2 target of 1.5C (viz. approximately 2.3C). If the Article 2 warming targets are met, and it is a big if, then neither an atmospheric CO2 level of 541 ppm, nor a pH as low as 7.95 would ever be reached.

While we agree that the SML is contaminated and that plankton numbers are under serious threat, the assertion that there could be a collapse of the marine ecosystem is currently unfounded. In any case, GMT will continue to rise, even after all-species net- zero is achieved, due to the thermal inertia of the oceans (See Fig. 1 below where temperatures maximize after all-species net-zero is achieved).

On the positive side, while current pollution problems are serious, they are largely correctable. Microplastics come mainly from tyres, particularly from heavy vehicles such as SUVs and electric vehicles (EVs). Already alternative tyre technology (air cylinder wheels) is available, and hydrogen-powered vehicles, such as those manufactured by Riversimple, produces car which are one third of the weight of most EVs [50, 51].

“Forever chemicals”, generated by Big Pharma and other companies in the chemical industry, recycle through the atmosphere and back to land by building up in sea-spray [52, 53]. Alternatives are available, but currently the companies are choosing not to use them because of increased costs. Legislation is urgently needed in this area to ban “forever” chemicals forever.

Globally, 20% of black carbon in the SML is from shipping, but, in Europe, 70% of black carbon comes from diesel exhausts which ends up in rivers, reservoirs and even water supplies [54]. It is therefore particularly unfortunate that the outgoing UK Government elected to postpone the phase-out date for petrol and diesel driven vehicles by 5 years to 2035, a decision that annoyed even the car manufacturers. Again, legislation is urgently needed to reinstate the 2030 deadline.

2.6 A challenge for the UNFCCC

In previous work we have exposed some serious scientific errors in the PA. One error is in the wording of Article 2, which, arguably, implies that warming is not allowed to rise above 1.5C (see also Section 2.2 above on breaching 1.5C).

A second more egregious error is in Article 4.1 of the PA. This concerns the concept of net-zero, and the main flaw in Article 4.1 (which purports to give emissions information relevant to the temperature targets given in Article 2 of the P.A.) is that the net-zero defined in Article 4.1 is one that considers only GHGs. Of course, this is incorrect. To be relevant to temperature targets, net-zero must consider all species that contribute to global warming. Thus, we need to consider both a GHG net-zero, and an all-species net- zero.

In our companion paper [1] we go into the details of how to determine the net-zero point for both GHGs alone and all-species, as originally delineated by Wigley in 2018 and 2021 (55,56). Here, we reproduce the main results for both GHGs (as considered in Article 4.1 of the PA), and for all-species, (which is relevant to the temperature constraints in Article 2). The results are shown in Fig. 1. The top two panels of Fig. 1 are the same as given in the companion paper, corresponding to a long-term warming of 1.5C. Here we give additional results for long-term warming of 2.0C. All three temperature trajectories involve temperature overshoots above the long-term warming amounts. For the 1.5C case, as noted above, there is no longer any possibility of staying below the 1.5C threshold, so overshoot warming trajectories are the only credible temperature projections.

As explained in the companion paper, the net-zero points correspond to the maximum points in the radiative forcing plots. The net-zero points also correspond to the points where either all-GHG, or all-species sources and sinks, balance (the wording used in Article 4.1).

Figure 1

The dotted lines show different temperature trajectories designed to stabilize GMT at 1.5C (with two different amounts of warming overshoot) and 2.0C. The maximum point of the continuous lines (GHG forcing) shows the date by which the aggregate emissions of all GHGs needs to be in balance with the removal of all GHGs (GHG net-zero). The maximum point of the dashed lines (Total forcing) is the “all- species net-zero” point. The differences between the Total forcing and GHG forcing plots are due to changes in radiative forcing due to non-CO2 GHGs (CH4, N2O, etc.) and aerosols, (largely sulphate aerosols). Total forcing is greater than GHG forcing because, in the emission scenarios, SO2 emissions decline leading to a reduction in the cooling effect of sulphate aerosols and hence, additional positive radiative forcing. (From Fig. 2 in ref. 55.) The y-axis shows temperature changes since 2000, so 0.7C warming needs to be added to give changes from the 1850-1899 baseline.

In the small overshoot scenario, (a) in Fig. 1, the required date for reaching GHG balance (GHG net-zero) is 2036. In the larger overshoot scenario, (b) in Fig. 1, the date for GHG balance is only slightly different: 2044: still six years earlier than the GHG net-zero date stipulated by the UNFCCC.

Total radiative forcing peaks around 2050 in both scenarios. This is the all-species net- zero point, and, coincidentally, the date chosen more recently by governments world- wide for net-zero. Even though nation states are working to a different, and far less demanding definition of net-zero, namely GHG balance, this has not been specifically defined in most published legislation, so there is no reason why governments cannot simply define net-zero as “all-species” net-zero.

Stabilization at 2.0C, (c) in Fig 1, is probably a more realistic scenario, but it is regarded by both the IPCC and UNFCCC as an intolerable warming limit. All three scenarios have warming overshoot, so there is a serious and significant danger that climate tipping points (CTPs) will be passed long before stabilization is achieved [57]. These considerations are even more applicable to higher temperatures: viz the current forecast of 2.6C of warming by 2100 if current policies are pursued [58]. And will certainly be reached and exceeded if the Fossil Fuel Industry continue to peddle myths about LNG being the transport fuel of the future rather than hydrogen (59).

The issue of CTPs is dealt with in more detail in a linked paper authored by the first author RRJ: Hazards in the Greenhouse: why is global warming so intractable? (Submitted to the Observer Research Foundation)

3. Conclusions

The above considerations demand a re-appraisal by the IPCC and the UNFCCC of the issues raised. It is anthropogenic emissions that drive climate change, so that should be the focus. Sinks are important, but they are not static entities, and there are obvious dangers if they are relied on too heavily to mitigate industrial emissions.

The IPCC has not helped the situation by failing to properly define net-zero, and the UNFCCC has failed to include all species that affect temperatures in their net-zero assessments. If the UNFCCC continues to champion net-zero as the overarching ambition of climate policy, then the IPCC should change its definition of net-zero, from GHG net-zero to all-species net-zero. This will require a more rapid reduction in GHG emissions, achieving GHG net-zero as early as 2036. It is the all-species net-zero that is the only net-zero that relates directly to the temperature goals of Article 2 of the Paris Agreement.

Both IPCC and UNFCCC should recognize officially that it is now impossible to keep global warming below 1.5C, and the IPCC should now examine more carefully and more

comprehensively the implications of overshooting the 1.5C target. It is obvious that eventual long-term GMT stabilization at 1.5C will require the deployment of carbon- negative technologies, and even methane capture technology, so these need to be researched as a matter of urgency. These should not, however, be used as an excuse by the fossil fuel industry to delay emissions reductions, as processes such as direct CDR are only viable with a “green” energy source (27).

The IPCC should develop a method for predicting the date by which we can be confident that the 1.5C threshold has been, or will be breached, so that policy makers can take timely action. UNFCCC should urgently explore the feasibility of introducing a Global Carbon Incentive Fund, a Global Methane Incentive Fund, a Global Ecosystem Incentive Fund for both marine and terrestrial environments, and a Global Carbon Historical Reparation Fund (GCHRP). This process will start on Sept 21, 2024 at a conference organized by RRJ at the Royal College of Physicians in London titled: “A financial Solution to Climate Injustice”. The idea behind this conference came from Neale Smither, currently BPs regional Director for India and SE Asia.

Finally, the IPCC should concentrate on producing annual reports on important subjects where there has been recent or evolving science, and where increased monitoring and research may be needed. All-encompassing scientific assessments have become unwieldy, and are now of limited value. We understand the overall science: it’s the political response that is lacking.

All scientists, and particularly all physicians, have a duty of care towards the future health of people and of the planet, so creeping certitude is no longer acceptable. It is time for the scientific world, the medical profession, the media and even organizations such as BP and the Royal Society to marshal their expertise and demand, unequivocally, science-based action from our political leaders. The IPCC has alerted us to the fact that there are thresholds (CTPs), which, if passed, could lead to irreversible climate feedbacks. There is a danger that, by ignoring these possibilities, events may

soon overtake man’s ability to avoid the outcome, namely the survival of human civilization as we have known it.

.

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