Working Group Reports WG13-WG16

Hira Almas
Nov 11, 2024
48 min read

WG 13 Reparations for Historical Carbon Emissions

Venue: The Royal Society of Arts Manufacturing & Commerce (RSA) Saturday September 21, 2024

WG 13: How to implement the GCHRF Proposal?

Co-Chairs: Titus Alexander (Democracy Matters) & Abhiir Bhalla (CHEC); Others: Geraint Davies; David Gomez (Ramphal Institute); Nawaz Haq.

GCHRF represents the Global Carbon Historical Reparation Fund as delineated in the briefing document provided at the conference: "Hiatus in the Greenhouse: Has the IPCC helped or hindered?" by Robin Russell Jones and Tom M.L. Wigley

The following introduction is a summary by Abhiir Bhalla, Youth representative for CHEC, The Commonwealth Human Ecology Council, and co-chair of WG 13, of the Hiatus paper referenced above.

Introduction

This paper critically examines the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and its relationship with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The authors explore the effectiveness of the IPCC in addressing climate change, highlighting the growing disconnect between scientific recommendations and policy action. The paper emphasizes that despite the IPCC's thorough reporting over decades, political and industrial challenges have slowed meaningful climate action.

Key points from the paper include:

1. IPCC History and Political Challenges: The paper traces the origins of the IPCC and its initial caution in affirming the role of human activity in climate change, evolving from a 50% certainty in 1995 to 95% in 2013. The IPCC’s incremental approach has, at times, diluted the urgency of climate change communication.

2. Carbon Taxes and Incentive Funds: The authors propose the implementation of a Global Carbon Incentive Fund (GCIF) to address inequities in global emissions, where countries with higher per capita emissions (based on consumption not production) would pay into the fund, while lower-emitting nations would receive compensation. Additionally, they suggest that separate funds be established for other greenhouse gases and emissions sources, like methane and black carbon.

3. Critique of Net-Zero Goals: The paper argues that the current definition of “net-zero” is insufficient, as it focuses only on greenhouse gases without accounting for other species that affect global temperatures, such as aerosols. They advocate for a

redefinition that encompasses all species affecting global temperatures, so-called “All Species Net-Zero”..

4. Breaching the 1.5°C Threshold: The authors contend that it is no longer feasible to keep global warming within 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. Instead, the goal should be to overshoot and then work toward reducing temperatures through rapid emissions reductions and new technologies like carbon-negative solutions, which currently do not exist on the necessary scale.

5. Future Climate Policies and Reforms: The authors argue for a more proactive stance from global institutions like the IPCC and UNFCCC, proposing the establishment of funds to address both current and historical emissions, and to ensure that wealthy, high emitting nations compensate low-emitting countries. They also highlight the need for more frequent, focused scientific reports from the IPCC instead of large, all-encompassing assessments.

6. Marine and Environmental Considerations: The paper also touches on the impact of ocean acidification and pollutants in the marine surface micro-layer, particularly microplastics and "forever" chemicals, warning of their long-term effects on the ocean carbon cycle, plankton populations and biodiversity.

The authors conclude that the scientific community, political leaders, and the public must urgently address these issues to prevent catastrophic climate tipping points and protect human civilization. They stress the need for science-based political action to meet climate targets.

Refutations of Existing, Conventional Arguments:

The Hiatus paper refutes several arguments and misconceptions related to climate science and policy. Here are the key arguments they refute along with the explanations they offer:

1. IPCC's Conservative Stance on Climate Science

● Refuted Argument: The IPCC has been slow and overly conservative in affirming the role of human-induced climate change.

● Explanation: The authors acknowledge that while the IPCC has incrementally increased its confidence in attributing climate change to human activities (starting at 50% certainty in 1995, reaching 95% certainty by 2013), this cautious approach has hindered public understanding of the urgency of climate action. They argue that this incremental approach, while scientifically sound, has contributed to public confusion and has delayed decisive action.

2. Net-Zero is a Comprehensive and Effective Climate Policy Goal

● Refuted Argument: The current global focus on achieving net-zero greenhouse gas emissions is a sufficient and scientifically sound strategy to limit global warming. ● Explanation: The authors argue that the concept of “net zero” is flawed because it only considers greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and fails to include other factors, such as aerosols, which have significant impacts

on global temperatures. They advocate for the adoption of "all-species net-zero," which would include all pollutants and environmental factors that influence Global Mean Temperature (GMT). The current "net-zero" definition used by many countries and the UNFCCC is inadequate because it does not account for the cooling effects of aerosols. In addition the UNFCCC only consider anthropogenic effects on carbon sinks whereas in reality they should consider both anthropogenic and natural sinks.

3. The 1.5°C Limit Can Still Be Maintained

● Refuted Argument: There is still a chance to keep global temperature rise below the 1.5°C threshold outlined in the Paris Agreement.

● Explanation: The authors assert that it is now impossible to stay below the 1.5°C target. Based on current emission trends and scientific data, they predict that this threshold will likely be breached before 2030. They argue that instead of focusing on maintaining the1.5°C limit, the global community should prepare for an overshoot scenario and prioritize rapid emission reductions combined with the development of carbon-negative technologies to stabilize temperatures in the long term.

4. The IPCC and UNFCCC Have Effectively Mobilized Climate Action

● Refuted Argument: The IPCC and UNFCCC have been effective in spurring governments to take appropriate actions against climate change.

● Explanation: The authors contend that while the IPCC has provided comprehensive scientific assessments, it has not been proactive enough in challenging climate skepticism or disinformation. The UNFCCC’s reliance on consensus, especially at Conference of the Parties (COP) meetings, has allowed certain nations, particularly fossil fuel-dependent ones, to block stronger climate policies. The paper suggests that progress has been hindered by political obstacles and a lack of enforcement mechanisms, especially when it comes to implementing carbon taxes or penalizing high emitters.

5. Carbon Offsets and Credits Are an Effective Solution

● Refuted Argument: Carbon offset schemes, such as those involving forestry projects and carbon credits, are a meaningful way to achieve emissions reductions.

● Explanation: The authors criticize carbon offsets as a distraction from real emissions reduction efforts. They argue that many carbon offset schemes amount to "accountancy sleight-of-hand," offering companies a way to appear compliant without making meaningful reductions. For example, the planting of trees and other forestry-related carbon credits are temporary solutions that do not address the underlying issue of continued emissions. The authors compare these schemes to "Medieval Indulgences" that allow

companies and individuals to assuage their guilt while continuing harmful practices.

6. Public Opinion Has Shifted in Favor of Climate Action

● Refuted Argument: There is widespread public consensus on the need for urgent action on climate change.

● Explanation: The authors highlight that public opinion on climate change has actually regressed in some parts of the world, with a rise in climate skepticism and denialism. They cite studies showing that in some countries, a significant portion of the population believes that climate change is a hoax. This rise in skepticism is partly attributed to the fossil fuel industry’s influence and disinformation campaigns, and the authors argue that the scientific community, including the IPCC, has not done enough to counter these narratives.

7. Carbon Pricing and Global Cooperation on Emissions Reduction Is not feasible.

● Refuted Argument: Imposing global carbon taxes and incentivizing emissions reductions through financial mechanisms like a Global Carbon Incentive Fund (GCIF) is not politically or economically feasible.

● Explanation: The authors advocate for a Global Carbon Incentive Fund (GCIF) that would tax high-emitting nations and reward low-emitting countries. They argue that such a fund would provide a financial incentive for reducing emissions and could be designed to be fair, using

consumption-based emissions data rather than production-based data. While acknowledging the political challenges, they believe that a coalition of the world’s largest emitters (China, the US, the EU, etc.) could spearhead this initiative, and others would follow. Additionally, they propose that border carbon taxes could be imposed on non-compliant nations to ensure broader participation.

8. The IPCC's Reporting Structure Is Optimal

● Refuted Argument: The current approach of the IPCC in producing large, comprehensive scientific reports every 5-8 years is the best way to inform climate policy.

● Explanation: The authors argue that these large, all-encompassing reports are too slow and out-of-date by the time they are released. Instead, they recommend that the IPCC shift to producing shorter, more frequent "special reports" on specific issues where science is evolving rapidly. These special reports would allow policymakers to stay more informed on the latest developments and could encourage quicker action on emerging climate challenges.

9. Fossil Fuels Like LNG Offer a Clean Energy Transition

● Refuted Argument: Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is a viable clean energy alternative during the transition away from fossil fuels.

● Explanation: The authors challenge the notion that LNG is a cleaner energy solution, arguing that its extraction, transportation, and use still result in significant methane emissions. They emphasize that relying on LNG perpetuates fossil fuel dependence and delays the transition to genuinely clean alternatives like hydrogen and renewable energy sources.

In summary, the authors systematically refute arguments that downplay the urgency of climate change, the sufficiency of current global climate policies, and the feasibility of more aggressive solutions. They call for a more comprehensive, science-based approach to climate policy that includes all contributors to global warming, rapid emissions reductions, and innovative financial mechanisms to incentivize global cooperation.

Primary Proposition of the Paper: GCHRF

The primary proposition of the paper regarding the Global Carbon Historical Reparation Fund (GCHRF) is that it should serve as a financial mechanism to compensate low-emitting countries for the historical emissions of high-emitting, industrialized nations. The fund is based on the principle that countries that have benefited the most from industrialization, and whose emissions have significantly contributed to climate change over the past 200 years, should be held accountable and pay reparations to those nations that have contributed the least to the problem but are suffering disproportionately from its effects.

Key aspects of the GCHRF proposition:

1. Historical Responsibility: The GCHRF is rooted in the idea of historical emissions responsibility, where countries like the United States, the United Kingdom, and the EU, which industrialized early and have contributed a large share of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions, should provide financial compensation to nations that have historically low emissions but are more vulnerable to climate impacts.

2. Reparation Mechanism: The fund would require high-emitting countries to make a one-off or recurring payments to lower-emitting countries as a form of climate "reparation." The amount paid would be based on each country’s historical emissions, and these payments would be used to help developing nations mitigate and adapt to climate change, supporting sustainable energy projects, infrastructure, and resilience-building initiatives.

3. Proposed Scale of Compensation: There is no precedent for climate change reparations, but the author RRJ proposes a figure akin to war reparations, suggesting that high-emitting nations could contribute a total annual amount of £200 billion or £20 billion annually for a decade. This financial transfer would be analogous to compensations historically

provided to slave owners after the abolition of slavery (£20 million in 1830 = £20 billion today) or reparations after major conflicts, reflecting the long standing benefits the Global North has reaped from fossil fuel

consumption.

4. Fairness and Equity: The GCHRF is designed to address the inequities in global emissions and climate impact. By compensating low-emitting nations, the GCHRF would act as an ethical and equitable financial tool to correct the historic injustice where wealthier countries have

disproportionately caused climate change, while poorer nations bear the brunt of its consequences.

5. Global Cooperation and Implementation: The authors propose that the United Nations should administer the GCHRF, akin to how it might manage other global environmental or humanitarian funds. They also suggest that this proposal requires serious discussion among the countries most affected by historical emissions, potentially at major international forums like COP meetings.

In essence, the GCHRF would not only hold high-emitting countries accountable for their historical role in climate change but also incentivize global cooperation by redistributing financial resources to foster sustainable development in the Global South.

Guiding Questions

1. Global Carbon Historical Reparation Fund (GCHRF):

○ How can we effectively design and implement the GCHRF to ensure fair compensation for historically low-emitting nations?

○ What criteria should be used to calculate each country's financial contribution to the GCHRF, and how can we secure commitments from high-emitting countries?

2. Global Carbon Incentive Fund (GCIF) and Related Mechanisms:

○ What are the practical steps to establish the Global Carbon Incentive Fund (GCIF) and ensure its successful operation at the international level?

○ Should the GCIF and related funds (e.g., Global Methane Incentive Fund, Global Ecosystem Incentive Fund) be based on consumption-based or productionbased emissions, and how do we manage discrepancies in reporting?

3. Reassessing the IPCC and Net-Zero:

○ Given the paper's critique of the current "net-zero" definition, how can we push for a shift toward "all-species net-zero" at future COP meetings?

○ What changes are needed in the IPCC’s reporting structure to ensure it provides more actionable and timely information to policymakers and the public?

4. Handling the Overshoot of 1.5°C:

○ Since the paper suggests that it is now impossible to stay below the 1.5°C limit, what should our global strategy be in preparing for this overshoot, and how can we integrate carbon-negative technologies into these efforts?

○ How should policymakers balance immediate emissions reductions with investments in future carbon removal technologies, and what role can developing countries play in this process?

5. Reforming Global Climate Policy:

○ The paper highlights the challenges of reaching consensus at international climate negotiations (e.g., COP). Should we focus on forming a "coalition of the willing" among the largest emitters, and if so, how can this be achieved without undermining global cooperation?

○ How can carbon border taxes and similar economic mechanisms be used to incentivize compliance from nations that are currently unwilling to participate in global climate funds?

6. Addressing Public Perception and Climate Scepticism:

○ What role should the scientific community, including the IPCC, play in actively countering climate scepticism and disinformation, particularly in regions where public opinion on climate change has regressed?

7. Equity in Climate Mitigation:

○ How do we ensure that low-income and vulnerable nations are fairly compensated, not only through the GCHRF but also in terms of access to climate finance, technology, and capacity-building for renewable energy?

○ Should there be specific mechanisms in place to hold fossil fuel industries accountable for disinformation campaigns, as outlined in the paper, and what would these mechanisms look like?

8. Phasing Out Fossil Fuels:

○ What concrete actions should governments take to phase out fossil fuel subsidies and promote cleaner energy alternatives, such as hydrogen, as proposed in the paper? How do we address resistance from the fossil fuel industry and fossil fuel-dependent nations?

These questions aim to facilitate a broad, yet focused, discussion on the feasibility, implementation challenges, and political considerations involved in turning the paper's proposals into actionable climate policy.

Action Points

Summary of the argument

A. Countries that industrialised first added most to cumulative CO2 emissions that cause global heating and climate damages. The United States is responsible for 20 - 25% of historical emissions, the European Union and UK over 22%, and Asia 30%, while Africa and Latin America are responsible for about 3% each.

B. Richer countries contributed most to climate damages and have the greatest ability to compensate for historic emissions, so it is only fair that they should do most to cut current emissions and make reparations for historical emissions.

C. Researchers estimate that industrialised nations responsible for excessive CO2 emissions could be liable for $170 trillion in compensation by 2050 to ensure climate change targets are met (‘Compensation for atmospheric appropriation’, Nature Sustainability, 6, pp 1077–1086 (2023)

D. It is arguable that countries are only liable for greenhouse gas emissions after the 1990 Earth Summit that set up the UNFCCC to “stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous human interference with the climate system”. Although this is contested, it may be that emissions since 1990 are charged at a higher rate: $60 dollars per tonne of CO2 rather than $30. Consumption-based data should ideally be used, but is only available from 1990. Prior to that date, territorial emissions will have to be used.

E. There are precedents for countries and companies paying compensation or reparations for historic damages:

● In 2021 Germany pledged €1.1bn ($1.34 bn) to Namibia for genocide committed during its colonial occupation from 1884 to 1915.

● In 2013 the UK paid £20 m to victims of abuse during the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya.

● In 1998 the four largest US tobacco companies settled lawsuits with 46 states by paying $365.5 bn, curtailing tobacco marketing and making annual payments for medical costs and anti-smoking advocacy by the Truth Initiative.

F. The legal settlement with major tobacco companies in 1998 highlights the risks of litigation and liabilities for fossil fuel producers.

G. Other precedents for corporate liability for harm to health or the environment include

● Companies and governments have paid billions in damages for harms caused by asbestos.

● The International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds (IOPC Funds) have paid £747 m (US$900m) since 1971 for over 150 incidents worldwide.

● China’s Environmental Protection Law 2015 has led to substantial costs and compensation payments for companies.

● In 2023 3M paid $10.3bn to settle a water pollution case over ‘forever chemicals’ in the US.

H. By 2022 over 2,000 climate-related cases had been filed in 65 jurisdictions (Global Climate Litigation Report: 2023 Status Review, UNEP

I. The economic and political consequences of imposing reparations on Germany after World War 1 show the potential risks from making unilateral demands for reparations and benefits of seeking agreement on a just basis.

This leads us to recommend that pioneering companies and countries should lead the way in acknowledging liabilities for historic CO2 emissions and establish robust mechanisms for payment.

Recommendations.

1. Responsibility for historical carbon emissions needs to be recognised by major contributors and the world community, through the UN, UNFCCC, G20 or CHOGM.

2. Representatives of countries that contributed most to historical carbon emissions (USA, UK, EU, Russia) and countries that have contributed least or are most affected by climate damages (Africa, small island states) should set up a scientific commission to establish historic liability for global heating and recommend a fair and effective mechanism for reparations.

3. Accountancy firms might be asked to calculate historical liabilities, but it is not possible to use consumption-based data before 1990 since this is not available. Furthermore the monies paid cannot equal the advantage to the Global North in societal progress that was facilitated by the burning of fossil fuels. The sums paid should therefore be seen as a substantial reparation rather than full compensation.

4. We recommend that industrial emissions before 1990 are priced at $30 per tonne of CO2 using production-based data.

5. We recommend that consumption-based emissions from 1990 are priced at $60 per tonne of industrial CO2 since countries could no longer claim ignorance of what they were doing to the planet.

6. Accounting firms such as PWC, KPMG, Deloitte, Ernst & Young, Munich Re, Swiss Re, Lloyds, Berkshire Hathaway and investment firms should include the risks of litigation and liabilities for climate damages in their reports on fossil fuel producers and associated industries, drawing lessons from the legal settlement with US tobacco companies in 1998 and ongoing compensation for asbestos,

Annexes

Estimates of responsibility for climate change:

1. Simon Evans, Historical responsibility for climate change is at the heart of debates over climate justice, Carbon Brief, 05.10.2021

2. Hannah Ritchie (2019) - “Who has contributed most to global CO2 emissions?” Published online at OurWorldinData.org: 'https://ourworldindata.org/contributed-most-global-co2'

3. Fanning, A.L., Hickel, J. Compensation for atmospheric appropriation. Nat Sustain 6, 1077– 1086 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-023-01130-8

WG 14 Final Fifth Mayday C4 Event

Venue: The Royal Society of Arts Manufacturing & Commerce (RSA)

Saturday September 21, 2024

Working Group 14: Does nuclear have a role in mitigating climate change?

Co-Chairs: Eugene Shwageraus (Professor of Nuclear Energy Systems Engineering, Cambridge) & Dr Robin Russell-Jones (Founder Help Rescue the Planet; Organiser Mayday C4 Events) Other members of WG 14: Prof Michael Bluck (Imperial College London); Prof Philip Thomas (University of Bristol); Prof Richard Wakeford, OBE (University of Manchester); Dr Peter Bryant (Sizewell C); Mike Middleton (former ETI); Prof Tom Wigley (NCAR); Prof Andy Stirling (SPRU).

Introduction

Predictably this was a contentious working group, and it is testimony to the open-minded nature of the conference and of the participants that some sort of consensus has been achieved between the two co-chairs. The discussion was initiated by RRJ (Dr Robin Russell-Jones) writing to his co-chair, Prof Shwageraus itemising the concerns that he had developed during the eighties when he was heavily involved in the nuclear debate. These are reproduced below under

A “Topics for Discussions”.

The response from Prof Shwageraus and colleagues is reproduced under

B. The case for Nuclear.

A further contribution was invited by RRJ from Prof Andy Stirling from the Social Policy Research Unit at the University of Sussex, who has been a long-time public advocate for renewable energy. His contribution is reproduced under

C. The case for renewable energy.

Section D is the result of the discussion and deliberations at the Conference itself on Saturday afternoon, Sept 22, 2024.

Topics for discussion.
In the 1970’s and 80’s, the expansion of nuclear power in the UK was stopped by environmental campaigners, notably from Friends of the Earth (FoE) UK, who gave evidence at the Sizewell Inquiry which concluded that no new nuclear power stations should be built in the UK until the nuclear industry had solved the problem of nuclear waste disposal. QUESTION 1. Has this problem been solved, and if so, how?
In the early eighties, RRJ prosecuted a letter-writing campaign through the correspondence columns of the Lancet against the NRPB and argued that the discharges from Sellafield were medically dangerous, and that the NRPB and the ICRP were using outdated cancer risk estimates. This culminated in a conference at the RPMS in 1986, organised by RRJ and chaired by Sir Richard Southwood FRS Professor of Zoology at Oxford University who was chair of the NRPB and went on to become Vice-Chancellor at Oxford. Russell-Jones & Southwood published the conference proceedings (Radiation and Health. The biological effects of low-level exposure to ionising radiation. John Wiley 1987). Subsequently the NRPB revised their cancer risk estimates, followed by the ICRP a few years later. The cancer risk estimates being used today are unaltered from the eighties, as far as I am aware.
However, the question of leukaemia clusters around Sellafield and Dounreay was never answered satisfactorily, though subsequent work by Prof Mel Greaves and others argued strongly in favour of a viral aetiology. This remains the situation today However, since no virus has ever been identified, the association between large nuclear power stations and lymphoma/leukaemia remains firmly embedded in the public’s perception of nuclear power. This is unlikely to change
The other problem with building large nuclear power stations is cost and over-runs. EDF and other nuclear-generating companies would have gone bust years ago were it not that they are state-owned and have been repeatedly bailed out by the tax-payer. The image of the nuclear industry as a ruinously expensive enterprise being propped up by the State is one that is unlikely to change any time soon. The same applies to nuclear fusion; but even more so. Many scientists argue that the best way to harness nuclear fusion is to tap into the energy being transmitted to Earth by a large nuclear fusion reactor in the sky is solar and other forms of renewable energy. It is also a lot cheaper.
There are some forms of nuclear energy that have been adopted in the public imagination and are uncontroversial: namely nuclear powered-shipping (Submarines, naval vessels and ice-breakers) and SMRs. These technologies would appear to be the easiest for the nuclear industry to develop.
One use for SMRs is to generate hydrogen, so-called pink hydrogen. Elsewhere in this conference it has been suggested that H2 is a far more acceptable fuel for all forms of transport than the fossil fuel alternative such as LNG which is even worse than burning coal from a climate change perspective (See WG 5). Plentiful supplies of hydrogen will be needed globally in the not-too-distant future. One suggestion is to establish a network of SMRs on remote islands around the globe (for safety reasons), and arrange for ships designed to carry LNG to carry compressed H2 instead.
We recommend that any nuclear waste from SMRs be buried on the remote islands chosen as the SMR operating site
Currently nuclear power supplies about 5% of the world’s energy. It has been claimed that this could be increased to 50%. However, there is only about 50 years of high-quality uranium ore left, so if we went from 5 to 50%, the available uranium would last only 5 years. Low quality ore is available in plentiful supply, as is uranium in the seas, but Life Cycle Analysis demonstrates that a point is quickly reached whereby the energy required to extract the uranium from these sources exceeds the energy generated. So, the whole process becomes unsustainable. We would therefore recommend that research is conducted into alternative types of nuclear reactors: possibly Thorium for example.
Further research is needed on the viability of nuclear power stations in the face of a changing climate. An acute sea-level rise put paid to Fukushima, but chronic changes in sea-level are just as difficult for the nuclear industry to cope with. Inland reactors rely on rivers for their supply of cooling water. During droughts, France had to shut down or slow down most of its nuclear reactors sited along the Loire. Research is needed as to how the nuclear industry can be more resilient in the face of a changing climate. There is no point building more nuclear power stations if they are flooded, or rendered redundant by an inadequate water supply.
I am not arguing that there are no resource implications with the supply of solar and wind farms. A particular problem is offshore wind turbines. The blades are not recyclable which seems particularly unfortunate in view of their massive weight (Each blade from a 4MW turbine weighs 15,700 kg ). Second, they are a major source of Forever chemicals. (PNAS) which is contaminating the marine environment and wiping out plankton populations globally. Each kg of blade releases 2.65 quadrillion microparticles each year. Over 180 kg of material is lost from each blade annually. They also release large amounts of Bisphenol A. My view is that the development of offshore wind should be stopped until these problems have been addressed and resolved. In any event on-shore wind was always cheaper, and now represents the cheapest form of electricity generation in the UK and elsewhere.
World-wide, here has been very little R & D into energy storage, and this is particularly true of the UK. Apart from the Dinorwik scheme from the 80s, little advantage has been taken of the UKs hilly terrain and potential for pump storage. WE should recommend an urgent re-appraisal of the feasability of pump hydro storage in other parts of the UK
World-wide very little R & D has gone into “hot rocks” as this is a source of renewable power that is not cyclical or unpredictable. Again we should recommend an urgent re-appraisal of geothermal energy in the UK and elsewhere particularly in granite areas
Worldwide there has been very little R & D into wave power and tidal power, both eminently suitable for the UK. We should recommend an urgent re-appraisal of wave and tidal power in the UK and elsewhere. The formulae used by Whitehall whereby payback is expected over 25-30 year should be abandoned in recognition of the fact that the pay-back time for projects such as tidal power with large upfront construction costs but low running costs is closer to 100 years.

NB. RRJ was Chair of the Pollution Advisory Committee at Friends of the Earth (FoE) UK from 1984-89, a period that coincided with Jonathan Porritt’s term as Director and Des Wilson’ term as Chair. This was the period when environmental campaigning in the UK was at its zenith, winning campaigns such as lead-free petrol, catalytic convertors, and acid rain, culminating in an international conference in November 1988 at RIBA on ozone depletion and global warming organised by RRJ and funded by FoE (UK), the Consumers Association and the European Cancer Research Campaign.

The following exposition of the advantages of nuclear power was kindly provided by the Professor of nuclear engineering at Cambridge University, Eugene Shwageraus and colleagues in response to the above comments by RRJ.

Prof Eugene Shwageraus (University of Cambridge, WG co-chair), Prof Michael Bluck (Imperial College London), Prof Philip Thomas (University of Bristol), Prof Richard Wakeford, OBE (University of Manchester), Dr Peter Bryant (Sizewell C), Mike Middleton (formerly ETI).

The Case for Nuclear

Carbon footprint of nuclear power is comparable to renewables and substantially lower than that of fossil fuels. Thanks to its energy dense fuel, nuclear power has small land requirements and minimal visual and environmental impact, even when considering accidents when it comes to modern nuclear reactor designs (Thomas and May, 2017). High abundance, diversity of supply and low cost of the fuel ensures energy security, as well as predictable and reliable power generation. However, nuclear power is far from realising its full potential in decarbonising the future economy. This group identified a number of issues and develop recommendations for addressing them.

Arguably the most acute problem of nuclear power in many western countries is the cost of construction accompanied by long construction times. This severely limits the rate of deployment and ability to finance the projects. The UK Government is aware of the issues and makes notable efforts to facilitate financing of large projects and support development of Small Modular Reactors which can partially address the long construction schedule and cost issues through modularisation, learning and mass production in factories. The ETI Nuclear Cost Drivers study (ETI, 2020) identified key issues which are in line with these observations and recommended committing to a build program. Most importantly, however, all large national infrastructure projects in the UK in general (e.g. HS2) face similar environmental and planning permission issues which lead to delays and budget overruns. Therefore, it is imperative that an overall infrastructure planning reform is prioritised by the Government. Resolving this overriding issue is key for successful delivery of large projects, including, but not limited to nuclear power.

The cost of renewable generation continues to fall, and economically viable energy storage options are becoming available, although remain at negligible level. Resource requirements and carbon footprint of massive deployment of storage should not be neglected and carefully appraised. Large energy systems modelling studies argue that substantial amount of firm energy generation, such as nuclear, is vital if the total energy system cost is to be minimised (Sepulveda et al., 2018, ETI 2015) This remains a valid argument even if the cost of renewables on per MW of installed capacity basis is lower. In other words, deploying the next cheapest MW now does not necessarily lead to the lowest cost of the future carbon-free system. Nuclear For Net Zero report by the Energy Systems Catapult (ETI, 2020) concluded that in all scenarios some baseload nuclear capacity always reduces the size and cost of low carbon grid. Furthermore, it offers opportunities for cogeneration and broader than grid applications. The cost of energy storage is uncertain, but does not change the overall conclusion.

It is argued that nuclear power and its fuel cycle pose some degree of public health risk. While leukaemia clustering near Sellafield was definitively proven to be unrelated to radiation (Wakeford, 2013, Elliot et al., 2016), it was a source of public concern when it was first discovered. People worry that large radioactive releases, even if rare, could have long-lasting and deadly health effects. This, in turn, led to traumatic experience of general public and subsequent opposition to nuclear power. Although, the scientific evidence collected by reputable organisations such as ICRP on such health effects suggests that overall public health implications of nuclear power are substantially lower than in other human industrial activities, even accounting the effects of accidents, the public perception of nuclear power remains hostile. Recommendation: Fair assessment of broad societal risks and benefits of nuclear technology is required as well as public understanding of these costs and benefits. To achieve that, community engagement by all the stakeholders, including the Government and nuclear industry, should be a priority. Trust can be built by listening and responding to the public concerns. It is important to accept that feeling safe is a personal decision which cannot be forced. Communicating the facts in an accessible way, not assuming prior knowledge, to different age demographics and disabilities groups should be the approach to public acceptance of nuclear power.

Nuclear power generates radioactive nuclides contained within used nuclear fuel. Some of these nuclides remain radioactive for long periods of time and, therefore, need to be isolated from the environment. It is often argued, given the example of Sellafield, that the costs and health risks of managing used nuclear fuel are prohibitively high. However, the complexities of decommissioning the Sellafield site have little to do with nuclear power, as it is mostly a legacy of weapons development program in the 50’s and 60’s. Managing used nuclear fuel from modern civil power reactors is a relatively simple and safe operation, comprising a tiny fraction of nuclear power generation cost. Furthermore, all forms of energy produce waste and have environmental impact that needs to be managed, sometimes forever (in case of toxic chemicals). Nuclear waste, on the other hand, becomes progressively benign with time and easier to manage. Nuclear industry is unique in accepting full accountability of its waste and fully internalised the costs of managing it. Dry-cask storage technology has been developed, in which the used fuel can be stored for many decades without requiring active cooling or extensive security measures. The ultimate disposal of used fuel, if the society decides that it is preferred to recycling and re-use, can be done in plentiful stable geological formations, where there is strong scientific evidence that radionuclides will be naturally immobilised for millennia even if engineered isolation barriers are degraded or damaged. This story is still unconvincing to many in general public who remain in opposition to nuclear power on ethical grounds, arguing that it is irresponsible to leave legacy waste to future generations to deal with; and it will be unethical to build nuclear power unless a functional geological repository is available. Recommendation: The complexities, risks and costs of nuclear waste management should be assessed through fair accounting of such risks and benefits across different industries. Establishing final disposal facility should be pursued through community engagement, communicating these costs and benefits in an open and accessible way. Siting geological nuclear waste repositories can be achieved successfully with local host community consent as evident from the experience with such a process in Finland, Sweden and France.

It is argued that uranium used as the main type of nuclear fuel in all current commercial nuclear reactors is a finite resource, the eventual scarcity of which will inevitably lead to rising costs and energy required for mining. The evidence of centuries of mining various minerals suggest that the scarcity price signal has always been sufficient to promote more efficient use of existing known resources, investment in new explorations and advancements in mining and extraction technologies. These factors historically led to relatively constant or falling prices of common industrial minerals. Conservative estimates of reasonably assured uranium reserves would support even the most ambitious nuclear expansion scenarios for at least a century. Fuel recycling and reuse in advanced reactors (which have already been tested) may be pursued in a distant future which would increase the accessible energy content of nuclear fuel by two orders of magnitude. Although not economically viable at the moment, thorium resource can also potentially be tapped into in a distant future. Finally, the efficiency of uranium extraction from sea water has improved dramatically in the past two decades, so that the cost of extraction is approaching that of conventional mining. If mastered at a reasonable cost, the extraction of uranium from the oceans would provide an effectively inexhaustible resource, making the nuclear power essentially renewable for all practical purposes. If enrichment technology becomes substantially cheaper (e.g. laser separation of isotopes), existing enrichment process tailings as well as reprocessed uranium from spent fuel will become a viable additional fuel resource. Recommendations: geological surveys to characterise the quality and quantity of accessible uranium are needed. Investment in uranium extraction from sea water as well as laser isotopic separation technologies may be beneficial as a hedging strategy against potential uranium scarcity. Research into advanced fast breeder and molten salt reactors should be supported along with efforts to preserve the experience and knowledge in these technologies.

Even if the power sector is fully decarbonised through an ambitious buildout program of renewables and nuclear power, many other sectors (such as chemical industry, steel, construction, building heating) of the economy would still require challenging transition to low-carbon emission processes. Conventional light water-cooled reactors operate at modest temperatures with limited potential to contribute to decarbonisation of some of these sectors, although nuclear has been used for district heating, wood pulping, and other low-temperature applications since 1950’s. Furthermore, a contemporary LWR project under development in the UK, Sizewell C, has plans for integrated hydrogen production and direct air capture facility. However, generation of hydrogen, synthetic fuels, industrial and agricultural chemicals, cement, iron ore processing and other applications could be more efficiently powered by advanced nuclear reactors operating at higher temperatures. UK government made a decision to focus on a particular technology to demonstrate these applications, but optimality of that choice is questionable. Co-generation would have other benefits. It would enable reactors to operate more economically at base load by varying the fraction of heat used for electricity generation in a renewables-dominated grid and it would provide operators with an additional revenue stream. Such integration will require adaptation of regulatory protocols, development of which is another recommendation of this Working Group.

It is argued that nuclear power plants are particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change such as floods and temperature rises of water reservoirs near which they are located. For example, flooding of Fukushima da-ichi reactor following a tsunami was the main trigger of the accident in which several reactor cores were damaged and radioactivity leaked into the environment. French nuclear plants located on rivers are directed to reduce power output in hot summer months in recent years. Floods and large temperature fluctuations may become more frequent in the future and adversely affect power generation infrastructure. Modern nuclear plants, however, are designed to withstand much more severe weather events and follow extremely stringent safety, reliability and quality control requirements. Furthermore, each historical accident served as important lessons, which were taken extremely seriously and lead to numerous improvements in nuclear plants safety, resilience and efficiency of design and operation. Modern reactors can operate in a wide range of climate conditions (e.g. UAE vs Finland) and have implemented multiple diverse measures against flooding following the Fukushima accident. Nuclear power is amongst the most climate change-resilient industrial infrastructure available today. Recommendation: energy systems, including new and existing reactors, along with other industrial infrastructure already incorporate measures that make them resilient against the effects of climate change. However, each of these measures should be judged based on common yardstick that can be applied fairly across industries and activities. in a broadest possible sense, including ethical considerations, against their cost and benefits to the future carbon-neutral society.

References

Sepulveda, N.A., Jenkins, J.D., De Sisternes, F.J. and Lester, R.K., 2018. The role of firm low-carbon electricity resources in deep decarbonization of power generation. Joule, 2(11), pp.2403-2420.

ETI, M. Middleton, 2015. The role for nuclear within a low carbon energy system, Energy Technologies Institute.

ETI, Energy Systems Catapult, Lucid Catalyst, 2020. The ETI Nuclear Cost Drivers Project Report. Energy Technologies Institute.

ETI, Energy Systems Catapult, 2020. Nuclear for Net Zero: a UK Whole Energy System Appraisal Project Summary Report, Energy Systems Catapult Net Zero programme, Energy Technologies Institute.

Thomas, P. and May, J., 2017. Coping after a big nuclear accident. Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 112, pp.1-3.

Wakeford, R., 2013. The risk of childhood leukaemia following exposure to ionising radiation – a review. Journal of Radiological Protection, 33(1), p.1.

Elliott, A., Gibson, C. and Wakeford, R., 2016. Committee on Medical Aspects of Radiation in the Environment (COMARE): COMARE Seventeenth Report.

C. Further Contribution from Prof Andy Stirling in response to A & B above.

The Case for Renewables

A starting point given your remit, lies in the potential contribution that nuclear might offer towards achieving climate goals. Here in the UK (as more widely), a common line of advocacy is that the climate emergency is so acute as to leave it somehow self evident that – as a low carbon option – nuclear power must be "part of the mix". In such ways, some proponents assert that nuclear is justified on grounds that we must “do everything”. Partisans often refer to a supposed need to “keep the nuclear option open” – as if this were an end in itself. As a result, policy discussions can be more about how much new nuclear to build, than whether to or not.

It is striking that UK (but tellingly less often, German) debates, frequently involve such arguments failing properly to address crucial queries about energy alternatives. Even more scarce, is balanced critical policy scrutiny of fully comparative evidence. But even before considering such details, the proposition that any energy option is self-evidently entitled to be backed (whether nuclear or renewable or anything else) – can in itself be recognised to be problematic. Indeed, it is a matter both of rigour and common sense that it is virtually never rational simply to "do everything".

If political capture by such polemics is to be avoided, a more reasonable approach is to aim at a carefully prioritised diversity of those strategies which perform best across different views and settings. So – especially for a challenge as imperative as climate – what matter most are queries about the particular portfolios of options, which offer the most substantial, cost effective and rapid prospects of progress in different contexts. Diversity is an important consideration. But there are many ways to achieve it. More attention and resources for less attractive options, means less for more effective ones. Diversity is too important a quality to be undermined by cynical rhetoric.

The reason this is important is not just that "do everything" arguments in themselves (on any side) indicate special pleading of kinds that are likely to be counter-productive. Almost irrespective of the view that is taken across a range of economic, operational, security and environmental uncertainties, it is also crucial to realise that the available technical evidence simply does not bear out the nuclear case. If efforts are made to properly assess comparatively, it can readily be seen across nearly all metrics, that nuclear is unambiguously outperformed by alternative renewable-based energy options. Longstanding still-current trends see this gap growing rapidly.

For instance in straightforward terms of economic costs, there is scarcely any unbiased source of energy expertise now – whether in academia, from international agencies, energy sector firms or national government bodies (including in the UK) – that does not acknowledge that renewable energy (with added system management innovations and energy storage to ensure 'firm' supply) clearly and significantly out-competes nuclear power across almost all geographical settings.

This is why statistical analyses (for instance, as recently published in Nature Energy) show national carbon emission reductions to associate less with nuclear than with renewable uptake. This is why arguments for nuclear power as a response to climate disruption rarely include a balanced comparative picture. This is why the main discursive tactic left for nuclear advocacy more generally, is to downplay (and often even entirely side-line) balanced attention to non-nuclear alternatives.

In short, nuclear contributions towards meeting climate targets tend to be smaller, slower and more costly than are more readily achievable by renewables. In addition, other statistical evidence shows that efforts to combine nuclear and renewables often tends to be counter-productive. Cultural, institutional and infrastructural factors optimised for one kind of generating technology often tend to undermine the other. So this makes it even more important to pursue a diversity of renewable-based strategies that work well together, rather than conflicting.

Especially in countries like the UK or France (where military pressures have historically helped make official commitments to nuclear power more strong and persistent), particular issues are sometimes raised in spurious ways – as if they alter this picture. One such distraction concerns so-called “baseload power". This idea that rigidly fixed output is required to manage the variable supply from some renewables has long been explicitly recognised as "outdated" by the electricity industry itself. Indeed (albeit much less discussed), exactly this kind of property in large nuclear plants also counts as a kind of inflexibility, that can pose its own very significant problems.

Now more than ever, myriad system innovations, grid improvements, demand measures and new storage technologies are all available to better match variable supply and demand over different timescales. The formerly pro-nuclear Royal Society recently authoritatively documented how a 100% UK renewable system outperforms any level of nuclear contribution. Even after it (remarkably) stopped publishing its own cost figures in energy white papers, the UK Government has itself also long admitted in background ‘grey literature’ that adding such 'firming' costs to the costs of renewables still leaves renewables strongly outcompeting nuclear. More widely, bodies like the International Energy Agency show the discrepancy to be even more stark and rapidly growing.

Likewise it is a further issue in its own right concerning rigour and democratic accountability in energy and climate policy, that this kind of bias towards nuclear power is routinely evident in countries like the UK or France (with strong military nuclear industry lobbies). For instance, it is difficult to ignore the partisan ways in which interests around successive UK governments have misrepresented official assessments concerning the relative performance of renewables. This is a grave claim to make about an even more serious issue. So it is important to substantiate it.

Here, one relevant example concerns high level UK Government denigration claims over the years, of the overall size of the available cost-effective national UK renewable resource. A strong bias is shown here by a history of what experience shows to be strongly overstated nuclear contributions, alongside repeatedly officially downplayed projections for renewable contributions. Even official analyses of exactly this question going back to the 1980s – which show a fully viable scale of renewable resource – are routinely ignored. It has in fact been clear for decades, that the UK is endowed with ample renewable resources to meet reasonably foreseeable levels of demand.

What is most striking, then, is that those many senior figures who repeatedly strongly imply that this is not the case are manifestly seriously misleading mainstream public debate. The gravity of this misinformation is shown by one UK Government departmental chief scientist who recently asserted with the supposed authority of 'sound science' (in a book circulated for free about “energy without the hot air"), that "physical limits" prevent the UK from achieving a fully renewable future. The manifestly incorrect nature of such a picture can be shown without wrangling over technicalities, for the stated constraint was surpassed by actual construction programmes within only a few years. Implications of this bias in UK energy debates, are all the more grave for being so little discussed.

Other aspects of UK discussions of nuclear energy strategies can likewise be recognised as skewed by other comparable kinds of bias from government, which also then condition public debate. Here again, a historical perspective can help avoid wrangling over ostensibly precise figures produced in risk assessments from different sides of the argument (each down-playing their own uncertainties). When past claims about nuclear safety are also considered in light of manifestly revealed experience, it can again be seen under virtually any viewpoint, that multiple nuclear accidents have in fact occurred of kinds that were long ruled by official assessments to be so “negligible” in their likelihood, that it was a matter of “public irrationality” for them to be attended to at all.

The same general pro-nuclear bias in UK debates has also been shown by the tendencies noted above, for cost reductions and growth rates of renewables consistently and massively to outperform what official projections routinely claimed in the past to be possible. Again, this can be clearly seen under any view. Yet there is strikingly little reflection (let alone contrition) by the same sources when asserting further nuclear optimistic positions. Questioning by the media is likewise strikingly scant.

Another example involves long-promised nuclear waste “solutions”, which are also highly prone to appraisal optimism – and still remain largely commercially undeveloped. Yet despite this record of failure, nuclear waste issues are often treated as if they have been dealt with. And in more general discussions about the epidemiology of low dose exposures to ionising radiation – despite claims about supposedly “irrational” public fears – the long run global trend has been for new scientific queries repeatedly to arise about what count as “safe levels”. Assumptions underpinning official assessments have been continually forced by new evidence into ever greater levels of stringency.

A lack of due awareness of history on these crucial issues, is also often shown in current burgeoning debates around small modular reactors. Far from the path-breaking novelty that is frequently implied, these typically stem from decades-old design concepts. Confidently claimed performance and cost improvements remain so entirely commercially undemonstrated, it is again remarkable that the hype is given such credulous attention in official policy and media debate. Often lauded as unqualified positive features, small scale and modular construction actually offer little ground for optimism over major improvements on experience with conventional large scale nuclear power.

Here, it often remains unreflected on (for instance), that a key reason why current generations of nuclear reactor designs are now so large, is that their poor economics aggravated strong pressures over the years to continuously expand unit size in order to realise economies of scale. It is this pattern which leads it to be uncontroversial to observe that nuclear costs and build times around the world typically far exceed those promised. Results of this have helped cause bankruptcy among formerly leading nuclear firms and some unprecedented instances of fraud. So it is again very unclear why these issues are so neglected in public discussions about small modular reactors.

Two key conclusions emerge from this summary of the general comparative picture behind debates over nuclear power as a form of climate action. Many uncertainties persist and much scope remains for divergent views. But overall patterns are strikingly clear. First, it is simply not credible to look at the presently available global comparative evidence and associated trends and conclude anything other than that renewable-based strategies unambiguously outperform nuclear power. Second, it is clear under any historical view (from virtually any side), that these debates continue to play out in ways that are remarkably inattentive to a long history of revealed pro-nuclear bias.

As a result, it may at least be agreed that the burden of persuasion should shift to those advocating nuclear as a means to ‘do everything’ on climate, to substantiate their case in balanced up-to-date comparative data. An open mind must be maintained. But currently available evidence is very clear that a rich diversity of fully non-nuclear energy and climate action strategies offer larger, quicker, less costly and more mutually coherent potential than any contribution from nuclear power.

D. Summary

The above three contributions demonstrate why nuclear power is such a controversial topic

However there does appear to be a role for nuclear in mitigating climate change, not as a large-scale provider of grid power on crowded islands such as the UK; but using Small Modular Reactors (SMRs). These could also be employed as a generator of pink hydrogen on remote islands around the globe. These issues cannot be resolved in advance of the conference, so will be discussed and hopefully ratified on Saturday afternoon (Sept 21, 2024) at the Royal society of Arts Manufacturing and Commerce (RSA).

Section D The Conference

The case for nuclear was presented by Prof Shwageraus (Professor of Nuclear Energy Systems Engineering at Cambridge University), with support from Prof Philip Thomas (Bristol University; and Master of the Worshipful Companies of Scientific Instrument Makers) on the health issues, and from Prof Michael Bluck (Director of the Centre for Nuclear Engineering at Imperial College London) on reactor design issues. RRJ and Nawaz Haq were in the chair and undertook a detailed examination of the claims made by the nuclear protagonists, who also fielded questions from the audience. It is unfortunate that Andy Stirling was unable to attend at such short notice.

The following items were discussed by conference, and a consensus reached on most but not all of the points:

Nuclear is low carbon compared with fossil fuels.
Historically nuclear is expensive (Strike price of £93/ kWh at Hinckley Point C compared with less than half that price for on-shore wind not accounting for the system costs). In addition, HMG has agreed to cap the insurance costs in the event of a nuclear accident. However, much of the cost at Hinckley Point C is due to the financial arrangements. No firm conclusions were reached as to how that could be reduced in future, but presumably it would require a different business model. In addition, the deployment of SMRs will reduce costs and steepen the learning curve.
Powering the grid using mainly nuclear has been done before (France) and is being attempted now by South Korea.
The dangers of nuclear need to be set against the dangers of other technologies.
Renewables may be cheaper to instal, but will incur system balancing costs.
Renewables are intermittent and will require substantial volume of energy storage, some will have to be long duration. The first battery is fully utilised, but adequate capacity to maintain reliability of the grid requires more batteries, and subsequent batteries are under-utilised, and therefore, more expensive.
Nuclear is useful as it provides a non-fossil fuel baseload. In addition, the price for renewables varies with the extent to which it has dominated the energy supply. Thus, when wind is supplying more than certain fraction of demand, it attracts a negative electricity price. In Germany, negative pricing began to appear when renewables provided only 30% of the Grid. Current wind generation capacity in Germany is about twice the size of their grid, yet, the grid carbon intensity barely changed over the last decade, with coal still supplying substantial fraction of electricity.
The cheapest system overall is more important than the cheapest next MW of installed generation. Having nuclear in the mix avoid excess renewable capacity (curtailment), and therefore keeps costs to a minimum.
The atomic bomb survival data from Hiroshima and Nagasaki may be the largest cohort to sustain lethal and sub-lethal doses of ionising radiation, but it is of dubious relevance to lower doses of exposure.. Ionising radiation is a recognised cause of cancer, , but the effects need to be kept in proportion.
Philip Thomas was a PI of a multi-disciplinary study on coping with major nuclear accidents (NREFS http://www.nrefs.org/) , which examined the proportionality of response to actual and hypothetical accidents. The question of evacuating civilians was discussed. The study concluded that the displacement of whole populations carries major risks in terms of unemployment, separation from communities etc. and that there is a survival risk to displacement in terms of suicide or decreased life expectancy (from drinking alcohol or taking drugs which were observed following Chernobyl accident). With Chernobyl 335,000 people were relocated, of which 97,000 received a life-long pension as they were unable to find work which contributed to their sense of anxiety and depression. NREFS concluded that only 30-70.000 should have been evacuated. However, the decision not to evacuate people exposed to nuclear fall-out is not necessarily something that the authorities can control in a democratic country, particularly during the early stages of an accident when likely exposures have yet to be calculated.
The “Not to evacuate” thesis seems more persuasive when applied to Fukushima, where the experience of local residents might have been coloured by the events at Chernobyl 26 years earlier. In all, 111,000 persons were evacuated, and a further 49,000 elected to move elsewhere, possibly to protect their children who are known to be more vulnerable to the effects of ionising radiation. Pregnant women would also tend to be overcautious. The NREFS generated a J (= Judgement) Value in conjunction with the NRPB, and concluded that the nuclear accident at Fukushima had resulted in 2 months loss of life expectancy. This should be compared with air pollution which costs Londoners to lose 9 months of life expectancy.
Regarding the disposal of high-level nuclear waste from a civil reactor; this can be kept in a cooling pond for 5-10 years before being vitrified into a glass compound for burial at a suitable geological site or kept in passively cooled (dry) storage casks for over a century at minimal expense before the decision on recycling or disposal is made. Concerns expressed by RRJ that cooling ponds were inherently dangerous if the power supply was interrupted (in the event of a terrorist attack for example, or in the event of a conventional war) were not accepted by Prof Thomas who claimed that the ponds were “self-cooling”. Spent fuel cooling ponds comply with the most stringent safety and security regulations, without which the nuclear plants would not be given a licence to operate. These requirements are significantly more stringent than those of other industrial installations handling substances which pose similar level of risk.
Vitrification of high level wastewas the practice in the UK but not anymore. Pond cooling now is followed by a dry-cask storage which is apparently accepted as “best practice” worldwide. The waste is passively cooled and only needs monitoring. This type of storage is extremely compact and can easily last for over a century. See for example: https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/economics-reprocessing-vs-direct-disposal-spent-nuclear-fuel _Bunn, Matthew, Steve Fetter, John P. Holdren and Bob van der Zwaan. “The Economics of Reprocessing vs. Direct Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel.” December 2003.

Conclusions and Recommendations

There is a role for both nuclear and renewables in our low carbon, and even zero-carbon energy future.
Nuclear will be particularly useful in providing base-load, especially whilst renewables have limited back-up in terms of storage.
The public, and the financial world are reluctant to support large centralised nuclear power stations, and the delays and costs of Hinckley Point C may harden their hostility to similar schemes in the future. Streamlining of permission and other regulatory approvals would help to reduce delays and therefore costs. More creative financing schemes should be used in future to minimise costs.
There is public acceptance of small modular reactors (SMRs). Such reactors provide multiple avenues for cost savings through standardised, high-volume manufacturing in factories and modular construction. The nuclear industry should pursue these avenues of development to demonstrate shorter construction schedules and cost reductions.
One possible use is the utilisation of SMRs to generate pink hydrogen since this can then be used in many industrial processes and for powering transport (See WG 5)
The questions surrounding nuclear waste disposal have certainly been addressed by HMG and its advisors, but we are still some way from a solution. Near-surface dry cask storage is a developed technology which is cheap and provides an opportunity for easy recovery of the remaining energy stored in spent fuel should the government or industry decides to do so. Disposal in deep bore-holes is also being developed as a viable option.

WG 15 Fifth Mayday C4 Event

Venue: The Royal Society of Arts Manufacturing & Commerce (RSA) Saturday September 21, 2024

Working Group 15: CCS, CDR & Methane Capture: Are they viable?

Co-Chairs: Prof Bill McGuire (UCL) & Dr Robin Russell-Jones (Founder Help Rescue the Planet; Organiser Mayday C4 Events) Others: Tom Wigley (NCAR); Phil Jones (UEA); Prof Euan Nisbet (Royal Holloway); Prof Josh Dean (Bristol).

(ORGANISER’s NOTE. A considerable number of experts refused to contribute to this WG including the current Chair of the IPCC Jim Skea; the past chair of the IPCC Bob Watson; and the Government’s advisor Professor Chris Stark. In fact, Stark refused to even acknowledge any of the numerous emails that were sent inviFng him to parFcipate. Readers may draw their own conclusions as to what is going on here, but it seems that the IPCC have formed a consensus with the Fossil Fuel Industry to promote CCS and CDR, even though they are clearly non-viable without a totally Green electricity supply. And if the electricity supply is completely green, then why bother to waste it on capturing carbon from fossil-fuel powered faciliFes. It makes no sense. Yet, despite this having been discussed by RRJ in the correspondence columns of the FT in March, HMG announced on Oct 4 2024, that it was invesFng £20 billion on developing CCS: presumably so that the technology can be tagged on to the new generaFon of ‘capture-ready’ gas-fired plants announced by the Sunak administraFon earlier this year.

IntroducYon

The use of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) is being heavily promoted by the Fossil Fuel Industry as the “solu>on” to climate change, since it seemingly allows us to go on burning oil and gas, or even coal without causing catastrophic climate consequences. Governments world-wide, as well as the FFI, have invested heavily in CCS technology. In the UK, the previous Tory administra>on announced permission for a new genera>on of gas-fired power plants that would be “capture ready”. World-wide there are now more than 40 CCS projects in opera>on, something that the FFI rely on to promote the benefits of CCS. However, none of these plants are opera>ng commercially. They are all “proof of concept” demonstra>on plants that are being heavily subsidised either by the FFI or poli>cians. Furthermore, CCS is energy-intensive, and using life-cycle analysis (LCA), is therefore only “viable” with a power supply that is obtained en>rely from renewable sources. (See FT lePers March 27 2024: “Industry ignores the stark reali>es of climate change”). This begs the ques>on as to why one would want to consume green electricity to remove CO2 from a fossil-fuel powered plant. It surely makes more sense to use the green energy supply directly. We would also emphasise that CCS cannot reverse CTPs such as the collapse of Greenland and the Western Antarc>c Ice Sheet (WAIS) which will occur given a rise in GMT of 1.5C. The use of CDR, (Carbon Dioxide Removal directly from the atmosphere) has also been heavily promoted as a “solu>on” to climate change, and not just by the FFI. Again, however the same strictures apply. CDR is very energy intensive, and using life-cycle analysis, is only “viable” with a power supply that is obtained en>rely from renewable sources. (See FT lePers March 27 2024: “Industry ignores the stark reali>es of climate change”). Since 80% of global energy is currently derived from fossil-fuel sources, CDR cannot make a significant

difference to the level of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere. Furthermore, if CDR is deployed a`er a CTP has been reached, then it will not restore the previous equilibrium. Excluding water vapour, methane is the second most important GHG a`er CO2. It has become a major problem as the concentra>on in the atmosphere has risen from a pre industrial level of 700ppb to 1900 ppb, and is con>nuing to rise. The IPCC has underes>mated the global warming impact of methane (by 56% according to some studies (Wigley TML Clima>c Change, 2018 & 2021) as it uses 100 years global warming poten>als (GWPs) when aggrega>ng the effect of non-CO2 GHGs. Scien>fically this is indefensible; poli>cally it means that countries that rely on methane reduc>ons to meet their Na>onally Determined Contribu>ons (NDCs) will be short-changed in comparison with countries that rely on CO2 reduc>ons.

RecommendaYons

1. We recommend that all CCS projects aPached to fossil-fuel powered plants are abandoned.

2. We recommend that the Fossil Fuel industry (FFI) stop promo>ng CDR as a solu>on to climate change.

3. We further recommend that research on CDR con>nue, since the technology may become viable once the world’s energy supply is no longer reliant on the burning of fossil-fuels. However, it cannot be expected to reverse Climate Tipping points (CTPs).

4. We recommend that research into the use of CCS with biomass and cement produc>on con>nue, as the technology may become viable once the world’s energy supply is no longer reliant on the burning of fossil-fuels. However, the same proviso applies with regard to CTPs.

5. We would like to see a judicial review of the UK Government’s decision to invest £20 billion in CCS (Announced Oct 4, 2024)

6. We recommend that the IPCC abandon the use of Global Warming Poten>als (GWPs), and that the UNFCCC recommend a more reliable method of aggrega>ng non-CO2 GHGs for the purposes of calcula>ng Na>onally Determined Contribu>ons (NDCs).

7. We recommend that research efforts are intensified in order to establish the rela>ve contribu>ons of different sources to the rising levels of atmospheric methane, and into the consequences of significant methane-outbursts from thawing permafrost and other natural methane sinks that might transi>on rapidly into sources.

8. We recommend that every effort be made to limit methane emissions both from industrial and non-industrial sources.

9. We recommend that research into the use of direct methane capture from the atmosphere be supported in order to establish whether this is a viable technology. 10. We recommend that the contribu>on of methane releases to the current accelera>on in global warming be ascertained, and becomes the focus of a Special report by the IPCC.

11. We recommend that all FFI plants responsible for fugi>ve methane releases be subject to strict emission limits and rigorous inspec>on globally.

12. Currently the IPCC/UNFCCC rely on industry for ground-up data on methane releases, and there is evidence that these are under-reported by the FFI. This problem could be solved by the crea>on of a new UN inspectorate: the Interna>onal Carbon Monitoring Agency (ICMA) supplemented by satellite data from instruments such as MethSat.

RecommendaYons

1. We recommend that all CCS projects aPached to fossil-fuel powered plants are abandoned.

2. We recommend that the Fossil Fuel industry (FFI) stop promo>ng CDR as a solu>on to climate change.

5. We would like to see a judicial review of the UK Government’s decision to invest £20 billion in CCS (Announced Oct 4, 2024)

6. We recommend that the IPCC abandon the use of Global Warming poten>als (GWPs), and that the UNFCCC recommend a more reliable method of aggrega>ng non-CO2 GHGs for the purposes of calcula>ng Na>onally Determined Contribu>ons (NDCs).

8. We recommend that every effort be made to limit methane emissions both from industrial and non-industrial sources.

11. We recommend that all FFI plants responsible for fugi>ve methane releases be subject to strict emission limits and rigorous inspec>on globally. Currently the IPCC/UNFCCC rely on ground-up data from the fossil fuel industry (FFI) for es>ma>ng methane releases, and there is evidence that these are under-reported by the FFI. This problem could be solved by the crea>on of a new UN inspectorate: the Interna>onal Carbon Monitoring Agency (ICMA) supplemented by satellite data from instruments such as MethSat.

WG 16 Fifth Mayday C4 Event

Venue: The Royal Society of Arts Manufacturing & Commerce (RSA) Saturday September 21, 2024

Working Group 16: The lethal and non-lethal effects of burning fossil fuels. Co-Chairs: Jonathan Ramsay FRCS & Dr Robin Russell-Jones (Founder Help Rescue the Planet) Others: Prof Frank Kelly (Imperial); Dr Trudi Seneviratne (Sec Royal College Psych); Prof Sir Stephen Holgate (Soton). (Organiser’s Note. Professor Gillian Leng, President of the Royal Society of Medicine, declined to contribute. Dr Anna Hansell, Chair of COMEAP, contributed but declined to have her name on the document).

IntroducFon

The first ever ar+cle in the medical literature about the health effects of global warming was authored 35 years ago by RRJ in 1989 (1), but since Lancet editorials are anonymous, nobody knew the author’s iden+ty un+l David Jones, Professor of Science History from Harvard, wrote a follow-up essay published exactly 35 years later (2). Since then, the medical profession has always been in the vanguard of warning the public and poli+cians about the devasta+ng consequences of unchecked global warming, culmina+ng in the Lancet Countdown Reports which have been published annually since the Paris Agreement of 2015. The burning of fossil fuels is a triple whammy for the planet and for beings that inhabit it, as combus+on not only contributes to climate change, it also causes acidifica+on of the oceans and creates air pollu+on with consequences for health that do not only affect human beings. In addi+on, the fossil fuel industry (FFI) produces plas+c which has been linked to declining plankton numbers and falling sperm counts. Thus, the ac+vi+es of the FFI affects four parts of the biosphere: Greenhouse gases in the atmosphere; air quality in the troposphere; plankton numbers in the marine Surface Micro-Layer (SML); and acidifica+on of the oceans. It is difficult to think of a more dangerous and damaging ac+vity for human health than the burning of fossil fuels.

The rela+onship between plas+c and adverse health outcomes may be related to the plas+c per se, but is more likely to be mediated through minute plas+c par+cles, both micro- and nano-par+cles, which become saturated with chemicals including “Forever” chemicals (PNAS) that exert adverse biological effects. There are thousands of Forever chemicals, so further research is needed in this area, but the precau+onary principle dictates that ac+on cannot and should not be delayed whilst further studies are carried out. Falling sperm counts may well relate to exposure to endocrine disrupters such as phthalates. In the SML, a whole host of lipophilic chemicals become concentrated on microplas+cs which reach concentra+ons up to 500 +mes the underlying water column. Plankton numbers have fallen by 50% since 1958, and are con+nuing to decline at 1% per annum. A similar decline has been observed with sperm counts. In some parts of the globe, for example the equatorial regions of the Atlan+c, plankton losses of 90% have been recorded. This can only end badly. Phytoplankton (algae) produce 50% of the world’s oxygen, so as numbers fall towards zero, we will all asphyxiate. Zooplankton such as krill ingest phytoplankton as well as microplas+cs, and when they die, they sequester carbon and fall to the ocean floor. We interfere with this part of the carbon cycle at our peril. In addi+on, zooplankton form the base of the marine food chain, so substan+al losses will create the circumstances for a

marine ecosystem collapse, something that could happen anyway if ocean PH falls below 7.95 (3).

Air pollu+on is responsible for more than 8 million deaths annually, making it the largest avoidable cause of death globally, greater even than smoking. The WHO recommended annual limit for small par+culates (PM 2.5) has been set at 10 microg/m3, but is shortly

reducing to 5. Very few places in the world, and certainly no urban environment, is able to comply with this standard. In the UK the previous Tory administra+on introduced an Environment Bill that s+pulated a legal standard for PM2.5 of 10 microg/m3, but not un+l 2040. Diesel exhaust is par+cularly toxic, and contains polycyclic aroma+c hydrocarbons (PAHs) in both gaseous and par+culate form. PAHs have been linked to developmental delay, lower IQ and mental health disorders in children which includes ADHD, depression and anxiety (4).

Under IPCC’s worst-case scenario, also known as “Business as Usual” (RCP 8.5), radia+ve forcing reaches 8.5 W/m2 by 2100, and atmospheric GHGs will exceed 1200 ppm CO2e. Sick building syndrome occurs with CO2 levels > 800 ppm, and levels >1000 ppm are associated with cogni+ve dysfunc+on (5). As the Holocene transforms into the Anthropocene, there are undeniable existen+al threats to human health and the environment.

One further lethal consequence of global warming is a wet bulb temperature of 35C; in other words the body temperature that is associated with 100% humidity causes death within 2-3 hours, even for young fit individuals. A similar effect is seen with a temperature of 45C and 50% humidity. Such combina+ons have already been reached in the Middle East, Iran and Pakistan, but normally individuals can find an air-condi+oned room or take a cold shower. However, as these lethal combina+ons of temperature and humidity become more commonplace, then certain areas of the globe will become uninhabitable.

RecommendaQons

1. We recommend that ins/tu/ons such as the Royal Society, the Royal Society of Engineering, The Royal Society of Arts, The Royal Society of Edinburgh and the Royal Ins/tute of Bri/sh Architects devote similar effort as the medical profession in warning the public about the health effects of unchecked global warming, but in their own areas of exper/se.

2. In order to ensure the survival of the human race, we recommend that combus/on of fossil fuels is prohibited whenever and wherever possible.

3. We recommend that Forever chemical are banned immediately and forever. 4. We recommend that the IPCC and/or UNEP begins an urgent inves/ga/on into plankton numbers

5. We recommend that WHO conduct urgent research into the chemicals responsible for falling sperm counts

6. We recommend that Governments world-wide legislate against the policies adopted by waste and water companies; that the Solu/on to Pollu/on is Dilu/on, by making them legally responsible for not discharging substances harmful to human or ecosystem health into our waterways, rivers and oceans.

7. We recommend that Governments world-wide priori/se air quality, and introduce WHO recommended limits by 2030.

8. Whilst most medical studies have concentrated on PM2.5, it is likely that nano-par/cles are even more hazardous to health, but are not rou/nely monitored. We recommend urgent research in this important area.

9. We recommend that the postponement to 2035 of the diesel/petrol phase-out in the UK be reversed and the original date of 2030 be reinstated.

10.We recommend that urban schools should be fiZed with par/culate filters to protect children from the mental health impact of par/culates.

11.We advise parents to not purchase diesel vehicles.

12.We recommend that CO2 scrubbers are fiZed to buildings rou/nely to prevent sick building syndrome, and so that indoors can provide sanctuary from high ambient levels of CO2 out of doors in the second half of the century.

13.We recommend that the UN designate areas that are likely to reach a wet bulb temperature of 35C (or equivalent combina/ons) as unfit for human habita/on.

Further Reading

1. Russell-Jones R. Health in the Greenhouse. Lancet editorial (Anon) April 15 1989 2. Jones D S. S+ll Seeking Health in the Greenhouse. Lancet April 13, 2024 3. Russell-Jones R. Hazards to Health in the Greenhouse. Why is global warming so intractable? (ORF; Under Review)

4. Dryden H, Duncan D (2022) Climate disrup+on caused by a decline in marine biodiversity and pollu+on. Int. J. Env. Climate Change 12(11), 3414–3436. 5. Russell-Jones R, Walter C, Kelly F, Holgate S. Air Pollu+on: The Public Health Challenge of our Time. The Ramphal Ins+tute Policy Brief Vol 2, No 27, Jan 2021. 6. Azuma K, Kagi N, Yanagi U et al 2018. Effects of low-level inhala+on exposure to carbon dioxide in indoor environments: A short review on human health and psychomotor performance. Env Int, 121: 51-56.

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